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I. INTRODUCTION 
The history of American voting rights is marked by two 
traditions.1  One expresses a continuing expansion of the formal 
right to vote beyond that found when the Constitution was framed, 
when only white male property owners of Protestant faith and 
specific age and citizenship had franchise rights.2  As former 
Supreme Court Justice Thurgood Marshall aptly put it: 
 For a sense of the evolving nature of the Constitution we 
need look no further than the first three words of the 
document’s preamble: “We the People.” When the 
Founding Fathers used this phrase in 1787, they did not 
have in mind the majority of America’s citizens. “We the 
People” included, in the words of the Framers, “the whole 
Number of free Persons.”  On a matter so basic as the 
right to vote, for example, Negro slaves were excluded, 
although they were counted for representational purposes 
at threefifths [sic] each. Women did not gain the right to 
vote for over a hundred and thirty years.3
According to Marshall, it would take “several amendments, a civil 
war, and momentous social transformation” before the right to vote 
began even to remotely approximate the promise of “We the 
people.”4
But while one American tradition is marked by an expansion 
of franchise, Alexander Keyssar notes another tradition 
characterized by efforts to deny the right to vote.5  There were 
repeated periods in American history where efforts were made to 
disenfranchise voters or to scare them away from the polls.  For 
example, after the Civil War, many Southerners used Jim Crow 
laws, poll taxes, literacy tests, grandfather laws, and not so subtle 
means, such as lynchings, cross burnings, and other techniques to 
prevent newly freed slaves from voting.6
 1. ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: THE CONTESTED HISTORY OF 
DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES xvi–xx (2000). 
 2. DONALD GRIER STEPHENSON, JR., THE RIGHT TO VOTE: RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES 
UNDER THE LAW, 41–65 (2004); KEYSSAR, supra note 1, at xvi. 
 3. Thurgood Marshall, Remarks at the Annual Seminar of the San Francisco 
Patent and Trademark Law Association (May 6, 1987), http://www.nyulaw 
global.org/graduateaffairs/documents/Marshall-Bicentennial-Speech.pdf 
(citation omitted). 
 4. Id. 
 5. KEYSSAR, supra note 1, at xvi–xvii. 
 6. See generally C. VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW (3d 
2
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In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, bans on 
fusion tickets, instant runoff voting, proportional voting, and other 
so-called reforms were instituted to discourage immigrants and 
urban poor from voting.7  In both cases, the pretext for the 
suppression of voting rights was the claim of fraud; the efforts 
resulted in significant drops in voter turnout. 8  This was America’s 
first great disenfranchisement. 
A second great disenfranchisement is afoot across the United 
States as, yet again, voter fraud is raised as a way to intimidate 
immigrants, people of color, the poor, and the powerless, and 
prevent them from voting.9  This time the tools are not literacy 
tests, poll taxes, or lynch mobs, but rather the use of photo IDs 
when voting.  Members of the Republican and Democratic parties 
have dueled over proposals to make voting requirements more 
stringent or more relaxed since the 1980s,10 but the real battle 
began in the Florida 2000 and Ohio 2004 presidential contests.  It 
continues today as allegations of fraud in both of those states have 
led to efforts to increase voting requirements.11  Following the 
disputed 2000 presidential election in Florida, Congress enacted 
the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA) as an effort to improve 
voting, but it came with some picture ID requirements.12  
According to the Wall Street Journal, at least half of the states have 
added additional alleged anti-fraud mechanisms since HAVA.13  
Moreover, several states, including Arizona, Georgia, Indiana, 
Michigan, and Missouri, have imposed photo ID requirements to 
 
rev. ed. 1974) (discussing the various techniques used to intimidate African-
Americans away from voting). 
 7. KEYSSAR, supra note 1, at 127–41. 
 8. STEPHENSON, supra note 2, at 143–54; KEYSSAR, supra note 1, at 159–62. 
 9. See SPENCER OVERTON, STEALING DEMOCRACY: THE NEW POLITICS OF VOTER 
SUPPRESSION 168–69 (2007) (discussing efforts to rig elections in contemporary 
America). 
 10. KEYSSAR, supra note 1, at 314;  But see STEVEN E. SCHIER, BY INVITATION 
ONLY: THE RISE OF EXCLUSIVE POLITICS IN THE UNITED STATES 1–5, 194–97 (2000) 
(arguing that contemporary politics is less characterized by mobilization of voters 
than it is by the activation of selected individuals, thereby making neither the 
Democrats or Republicans necessarily champions of universal franchise). 
 11. See ROBERT FITRAKIS ET AL., WHAT HAPPENED IN OHIO: A DOCUMENTARY 
RECORD OF THEFT AND FRAUD IN THE 2004 ELECTION (2006) (arguing that the 
Secretary of State engaged in numerous attempts to suppress voter turnout before 
the 2004 presidential election in that state). 
     12.    42 U.S.C. § 15301 (2002). 
     13.    Christopher Conkey, Attention, Voters: Have Your ID Ready, WALL ST. J., Oct. 
31, 2006, at D1. 
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vote at the polls.14  Proponents justify these efforts on the premise 
that voter fraud is real and that these measures are needed to 
control it.15  As the 2008 presidential and congressional elections 
approach, claims of voter fraud and the issue of photo IDs are 
heating up.  Fraud has become a partisan issue, with Republicans 
appearing to support voter IDs and Democrats opposing it.16  In 
addition, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to a 
photo ID case—Crawford v. Marion County Election Board17—setting 
the stage for constitutional resolution of the new requirements just 
in time for the 2008 elections.18  A Supreme Court decision 
upholding voter ID laws could encourage even more states to adopt 
such laws, further enabling the second great disenfranchisement. 
This article examines voter fraud and efforts to regulate it 
through new photo ID requirements.  The overall thesis is that 
voter fraud is used as a pretext for a broader agenda to 
disenfranchise Americans and rig elections.  But the more specific 
focus of this article is to examine the evidence of fraud and the 
litigation surrounding voter IDs thus far, and to analyze what 
supporters of voting rights can learn from both as they move 
forward to challenge these laws.  The article argues that the 
evidence being offered to support photo IDs does not justify the 
restrictions being imposed.  In addition, the article contends that 
the courts have generally reached the wrong conclusions when 
adjudicating photo ID claims.  Specifically, the article takes aim at 
the apparent test articulated in Burdick v. Takushi19 that seems to 
justify treating franchise as less than a fundamental right, thereby 
permitting the adoption of some regulations that adversely impact 
     14.    ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16.121.01 (2006); GA. CODE. ANN. § 21-2-417 (a) 
(Supp. 2007) validity questioned by Common Cause/Ga. League of Women Voters, 
Inc. v. Billups, 439 F. Supp. 2d 1294 (N.D. Ga. 2006) (holding that requiring 
photo identification at the polling booth was substantially likely to violate the 
Equal Protection Clause); IND. CODE. § 3-11-8-25.1 (b) (Supp. 2007);  MICH. COMP. 
LAWS § 168.523 (1) (Supp. 2007); MO. ANN. STAT. § 115.427 (1) (Supp. 2007). 
     15.   United States Senate Republican Policy Committee, The Need for New Federal 
Reforms: Putting An End To Voter Fraud, Feb. 15, 2005, http://rpc.senate.gov/_files/ 
Feb1504VoterFraudSD.pdf. 
 16. Adam Liptak, Fear But Few Facts in Debate on Voter IDs, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 
2007, at A12. 
 17. 472 F.3d. 951 (7th Cir. 2007), cert. granted, 76 U.S.L.W. 3122, 3154 (U.S. 
Sept. 25, 2007) (No. 07-21). 
 18. Linda Greenhouse, Justices Agree to Hear Case Challenging Voter ID Laws, 
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 2007, at A24. 
 19. 504 U.S. 428 (1992). 
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voting rights.  Courts, this article will contend, have generally 
misapplied this test.  Additionally, as this article puts forth, the test 
itself is incoherent and unworkable. 
Part I briefly describes the evolution of voting rights in the 
United States and reviews the implications of Burdick.  Part II 
critically examines the literature and evidence on voting fraud.  
Part III evaluates litigation surrounding state efforts to enact photo 
ID requirements for voting and discusses how courts have ruled 
thus far on these new requirements.  Finally, Part IV puts forth a 
critical analysis of the litigation so far and presents a road map 
showing how voting rights supporters can successfully challenge 
future attempts to limit voting rights.  Overall, the article concludes 
that the photo ID laws are unconstitutional, but unless plaintiffs 
can provide better arguments in opposing these laws, America will 
face the next great wave of voter disenfranchisement. 
II. THE RIGHT TO VOTE 
Bush v. Gore20 was a controversial landmark decision in which 
the Supreme Court halted the ballot recount in the 2000 Florida 
presidential election.  But in so holding, the Court reminded voters 
that the Constitution does not guarantee the right to vote in 
presidential elections.21  In fact, while the Court has ruled that 
voting is a fundamental right protected under the Constitution,22 it 
has done so in a way that belies the original text of the document. 
Nowhere in the United States Constitution is there an explicit 
declaration of the right to vote.  More specifically, Article II, section 
1 grants to the states the authority to determine how they will select 
electors who will choose the president.  The original Constitution 
also permitted state legislatures to select the U.S. Senators,23 while 
members of the Supreme Court were to be appointed by the 
President, subject to confirmation by the Senate.24  The only public 
officials whom the people could select were the members of the 
House of Representatives,25 rendering rather thin any notion that 
the citizens had broad franchise rights when selecting the national 
government. 
 20. 531 U.S. 98 (2000). 
 21. Id. at 104 (referencing Article II, section 1 of the Constitution). 
 22. Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966). 
 23. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 1. 
 24. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
 25. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1. 
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Initially, the Constitution appears to have left that right up to 
the states, which generally limited franchise to white male property 
owners who were citizens of a certain age and, occasionally, 
members of a specific religious faith.26  For example, in Minor v. 
Happersett27 the Supreme Court rejected a claim by a Missouri 
woman that as a citizen she had a right to vote under the 
Constitution.  The Court dismissed her claim, indicating that 
citizenship did not necessarily include the right to vote; states could 
decide who had that right.28
After the Civil War, the nation adopted a series of 
constitutional amendments that addressed the right to vote.  The 
Fifteenth Amendment prohibited states from denying the right to 
vote on account of “race, color, or previous condition of servitude.”  
The Seventeenth Amendment permitted the direct election of 
United States Senators.  The Nineteenth Amendment enfranchised 
women.  The Twenty-Fourth Amendment banned poll taxes. The 
Twenty-Sixth Amendment directed states to allow qualified citizens 
who were age eighteen or older to vote.  Yet, none of these 
amendments affirmatively granted the right to vote. 
It was not until the 1940s that the Supreme Court affirmatively 
addressed the constitutional right to vote.  In United States v. 
Classic,29 a case arising out of voter fraud in a Louisiana federal 
election primary, the Court addressed whether one has a right to 
vote.30 Secondarily, it addressed whether depriving a person of that 
right came within the meaning of a federal criminal law that made 
it illegal to “injure and oppress citizens in the free exercise and 
enjoyment of rights and privileges secured to them by the 
Constitution and laws of the United States.”31  The Court stated: 
 We come then to the question whether that right is one 
secured by the Constitution.  Section 2 of Article I 
commands that Congressmen shall be chosen by the 
people of the several states by electors, the qualifications 
of which it prescribes.  The right of the people to choose, 
whatever its appropriate constitutional limitations, where 
in other respects it is defined, and the mode of its exercise 
is prescribed by state action in conformity to the 
 26. KEYSSAR, supra note 1, at 21–25. 
 27. 88 U.S. 162 (1874). 
     28.    Id. at 177.  
 29. 313 U.S. 299 (1941). 
 30. Id. at 307. 
 31. Id.at 308 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 51 (1940)). 
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Constitution, is a right established and guaranteed by the 
Constitution and hence is one secured by it to those 
citizens and inhabitants of the state entitled to exercise 
the right.32
Later, in Reynolds v. Sims,33 reaffirmed that the Constitution 
protects the right to vote in federal elections.34  In so doing, the 
Court embraced the principle of equal representation for equal 
numbers of people—one person, one vote—for reapportionment 
purposes.35  Furthermore, the Court in Reynolds drew a parallel 
between the right to vote and the right to procreate, which was at 
issue in Skinner v. Oklahoma,36 declaring the right to vote as 
fundamental.37
Locating constitutional text to support the right to vote in 
state elections is more problematic. In Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of 
Elections,38 the Supreme Court, in striking down the imposition of a 
poll tax in state elections, ruled that the right to vote in state 
elections was located in the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process 
and Equal Protection Clauses.39  Although the tax met traditional 
constitutional standards because it was neither racially 
discriminatory nor indefensible as rational policy, the Court still 
found that it unconstitutionally singled out the poor.40  More 
importantly, the Court yet again affirmed the importance of voting, 
stating that “[l]ong ago in Yick Wo v. Hopkins, the Court referred to 
‘the political franchise of voting’ as a ‘fundamental political right, 
because [it is] preservative of all rights.’”41  Again, as in Reynolds, the 
Court drew a parallel between voting and the right of procreation 
found in Skinner,  ruling that where “fundamental rights and 
liberties are asserted under the Equal Protection Clause, 
classifications which might invade or restrain them must be closely 
scrutinized and carefully confined.”42  Specifically, the Court cited 
 32. Id. at 314. 
 33. 377 U.S. 533 (1964). 
     34.    Id. at 554.  
 35. Id. at 558. 
 36. 316 U.S. 535 (1942). 
 37. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 561. 
 38. 383 U.S. 663 (1966). 
 39. Id. at 665. 
 40. Id. at 666-67. 
 41. Id. at 667 (quoting 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886)). 
 42. Id. at 670. 
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to language in Skinner dictating that efforts to interfere with the 
right to procreation must be subject to strict scrutiny.43
The legacy of Classic, Reynolds, and Harper is judicial 
recognition of voting as a fundamental right, subject to strict 
scrutiny.  In addition to these three cases, the Court reached 
similar conclusions elsewhere.44  Collectively, these cases suggest 
that interference with or regulation of the fundamental right to 
vote must be subject to strict scrutiny and that the right may only be 
limited if a compelling government interest overrides it.45  
Unfortunately, the Court created some confusion on this point in 
Burdick v.  Takushi.46
In Burdick, the issue was a Hawaii state law prohibiting write-in 
voting.47  In rejecting the First and Fourteenth Amendment 
challenges to the law,48 the Supreme Court described its approach 
to voting rights regulations: 
 It is beyond cavil that “voting is of the most fundamental 
significance under our constitutional structure.” It does 
not follow, however, that the right to vote in any manner 
and the right to associate for political purposes through 
the ballot are absolute. The Constitution provides that 
States may prescribe “[t]he Times, Places and Manner of 
holding Elections for Senators and Representatives,” Art.  
 43. Id. (citing Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942)). 
 44. See e.g., Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 104 (2000); Ill. Bd. of Elections v. 
Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173 (1979); Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 756 
(1974) (“[W]hen legislation burdens such a fundamental constitutional right, it is 
not enough that the legislative means rationally promote legitimate governmental 
ends.  Rather, ‘governmental action may withstand constitutional scrutiny only 
upon a clear showing that the burden imposed is necessary to protect a 
compelling and substantial governmental interest.’” (citations omitted)); Rosario 
v. Rockefeller,  410 U.S. 752, 767–68 (1973); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 336 
(1972); Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 142 (1970); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 
23, 38 (1968) (declaring “[w]hen ‘fundamental rights and liberties' are at issue, a 
State has less leeway in making classifications than when it deals with economic 
matters.” (citations omitted)); Cardona v. Power, 384 U.S. 672, 676 (1966) (ruling 
that “[w]here classifications might ‘invade or restrain’ fundamental rights and 
liberties, they must be ‘closely scrutinized and carefully confined.’”(citations 
omitted)). 
 45. See generally Stephen E. Gottlieb, Compelling Governmental Interests: An 
Essential But Unanalyzed Term in Constitutional Adjudication, 68 B.U.L. REV. 917 
(1988) (presenting a general discussion of the interplay between fundamental 
rights and compelling governmental interests). 
 46. 504 U.S. 428 (1992). 
 47. Id. at 430. 
 48. Id. at 430–31. 
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I, § 4, cl. 1, and the Court therefore has recognized that 
States retain the power to regulate their own elections.49
According to the Court, states or the government must 
structure elections to promote fairness and honesty.50  Thus, not all 
regulations need to be subject to strict scrutiny simply because they 
impose some burdens on voters. 
 Election laws will invariably impose some burden upon 
individual voters. Each provision of a code, “whether it 
governs the registration and qualifications of voters, the 
selection and eligibility of candidates, or the voting 
process itself, inevitably affects—at least to some degree—
the individual’s right to vote and his right to associate with 
others for political ends.”  Consequently, to subject every 
voting regulation to strict scrutiny and to require that the 
regulation be narrowly tailored to advance a compelling 
state interest, as petitioner suggests, would tie the hands 
of States seeking to assure that elections are operated 
equitably and efficiently.  Accordingly, the mere fact that 
a State’s system “creates barriers . . . tending to limit the 
field of candidates from which voters might choose . . . 
does not of itself compel close scrutiny.” 51
Apparently replacing the strict scrutiny standard previously 
used to examine the right to vote, the Court proposed a different 
test to be used: 
A court considering a challenge to a state election law 
must weigh “the character and magnitude of the asserted 
injury to the rights protected by the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments that the plaintiff seeks to vindicate” against 
“the precise interests put forward by the State as 
justifications for the burden imposed by its rule,” taking 
into consideration “the extent to which those interests 
make it necessary to burden the plaintiff’s rights.” 52
Thus, in examining Hawaii’s ban on write-in voting, the Court used 
this new flexible standard to uphold it.53
The Burdick decision is confusing.  While it perhaps looks as if 
the Court ruled that all regulations affecting voting need to be 
 49. Id. at 433 (citing Ill. Bd. of Elections, 440 U.S. at 184; Munro v. Socialist 
Workers Party, 479 U.S. 189, 193 (1986)). 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. (quoting Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788 (1983); Bullock v. 
Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 143 (1972)).  
 52. Id. at 434 (quoting Anderson, 460 U.S. at 789).  
 53. Id. 
9
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examined from this new flexible and less rigorous standard, the 
language citations suggest otherwise.  First, in referencing the cases 
where the Court held that the right to vote is not absolute, it cited 
not to cases about voting rights per se, but to cases involving ballot 
access and the rights of political parties.54  These references 
question the degree to which the Court diluted its previous strict 
scrutiny test.  Second, and more importantly, the Court sowed 
seeds of doubt by distinguishing between two different types of 
voting regulations—those which impose “severe” versus 
“reasonable” burdens.55  Regulations imposing the former types of 
burdens would continue to be examined under the strict scrutiny 
standard under which they must be “narrowly drawn to advance a 
state interest of compelling importance.”56  But for the latter, the 
new standard would be used “when a state election law provision 
imposes only ‘reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions’ upon the 
First and Fourteenth Amendment rights of voters, as ‘the State’s 
important regulatory interests are generally sufficient to justify’ the 
restrictions.”57  Unfortunately, the Court failed to describe what 
constituted a severe burden versus a reasonable one, creating 
confusion about which standard applies to which regulation.  This 
confusion set the stage for later disputes over efforts to enact voter 
ID laws. 
III. THE SPECTER OF VOTER FRAUD 
A. The Legacy of Florida 2000 
Allegations of voter fraud and election rigging go back to the 
earliest days of American history.  George Washington was accused 
of using rum to buy votes.58  Efforts to tighten restrictions on 
African-American franchise rights after the Civil War and upon 
urban, immigrant, and poor voters during the Populist and 
Progressive eras were ostensibly to combat election fraud,59 even 
though, as Keyssar notes, there was little hard evidence to support 
 54. See id. at 432–33. 
 55. Id. at 434. 
 56. Id. (quoting Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S. 279, 289 (1992)). 
 57. Id. 
 58. MELVIN I. UROFSKY, MONEY & FREE SPEECH: CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM AND 
THE COURTS 4-5 (2005). 
 59. Keyssar, supra note 1, at 159. 
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the rumors and allegations that this type of corruption was 
systematic.60   
The most recent efforts to restrict or regulate voting rights in 
the name of combating fraud grew out of the disputed Florida 2000 
presidential election.  The 2000 presidential race between George 
W. Bush and Al Gore was close, with the allocation of Florida’s 
electoral votes determining who became president.  The popular 
vote in Florida gave Bush a lead of less than 1800 votes,61 but 
concern soon surfaced on many fronts about the fairness and 
accuracy of the voting procedures and counting.62
Kathryn Harris, the Florida Secretary of State and state chair of 
the Bush election committee, was embroiled in the middle of major 
controversies that alleged pre-election voter purges directed at 
African-Americans, the random opening and closing of polls, the 
intimidation of minority voters, the use of faulty and different 
voting technologies across the state, bad ballot designs, and 
outright allegations of ineligible voters falsely identifying 
themselves in order to vote.63  While Bush v. Gore only addressed the 
issues of vote counting arising under the Equal Protection clause,64 
rumors arising out of the election persisted,65 fueling allegations 
stemming back to the 1990s purporting that passage of the Motor 
Voter Act, which permitted mail-in and same-day voter registration, 
would enable voter fraud.66  Again, after the close 2004 presidential 
race between John Kerry and George W. Bush, similar allegations 
of both voter intimidation and fraud arose in Ohio.67
 60. See id. 
 61. ABNER GREENE, UNDERSTANDING THE 2000 ELECTION:  A GUIDE TO THE 
LEGAL BATTLES THAT DECIDED THE PRESIDENCY 43 (2001). 
 62. Id. at 44–49. 
 63. GERALD M. POMPER, THE ELECTION OF 2000 127–28 (2001); Greene, supra 
note 61, at 42–45.  See generally VINCENT BUGLIOSI, THE BETRAYAL OF AMERICA: HOW 
THE SUPREME COURT UNDERMINDED THE CONSTITUTION AND CHOSE OUR PRESIDENT 
(2001); ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, SUPREME INJUSTICE: HOW THE HIGH COURT HIJACKED 
ELECTION 2000 (2001) (detailing the litany of allegations about the rigging of the 
Florida 2000 election). 
 64. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 108–110 (2000). 
 65. See David Schultz, Election 2000: The Bush v. Gore Scholarship, 4 PUB. 
INTEGRITY 360 (2002) (reviewing ten books that examined allegations of voter 
fraud and irregularities surrounding Bush v. Gore and the Florida 2000 
presidential election results). 
 66. Keyssar, supra note 1, at 314. 
 67. See generally STEVE FREEMAN & JOEL BLEIFUSS, WAS THE 2004 PRESIDENTIAL 
ELECTION STOLEN?:  EXIT POLLS, ELECTION FRAUD, AND THE OFFICIAL COUNT (2006); 
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B. Documenting Voter Fraud 
Is there widespread voter fraud in the United States that is 
affecting elections?  The answer is not easy, given that there are no 
comprehensive peer-reviewed studies examining voting fraud in 
the United States.68  For the most part, most of the stories about 
fraud are just that—stories and anecdotal tidbits of information not 
well corroborated or systematically studied.  On top of that, the 
term “voter fraud” is vague.69  Lorraine Minnite seeks to define 
voter fraud by drawing upon a broader Department of Justice 
definition: election fraud is “conduct that corrupts the process by 
which ballots are obtained, marked, or tabulated; the process by 
which election results are canvassed and certified; or the process by 
which voter are registered.”70
Minnite locates voter fraud as a subcategory of this broader 
concept of election fraud, defining it as the “intentional corruption 
of the electoral process by voters.”71  She wishes to distinguish this 
form of fraud from that which takes place at the hands of election 
officials, parties, candidates, and others who are involved in 
election administration and political campaigns.72  This article 
employs Minnite’s definition of voter fraud.  But it is important to 
note that besides voter fraud, this article also refers to other forms 
of election fraud as “election official fraud.”  The latter includes 
situations in which election officials or parties other than voters 
falsely register or permit ineligible individuals to vote, engage in 
vote buying or swapping, or engage in other forms of vote 
suppression or manufacturing.73
 
FITRAKIS, supra note 11 (discussing allegations of voter fraud in 2004 presidential 
election). 
 68. U.S. ELECTIONS ASSISTANCE COMMISSION, ELECTION CRIMES: AN INITIAL 
REVIEW AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE STUDY 20 (2006), available at 
http://www.eac.gov/clearinghouse/docs/reportsandsurveys2006electioncrimes. 
pdf/attachment_download/file. 
 69. LORRAINE C. MINNITE, THE POLITICS OF VOTER FRAUD 6 (2007), available at 
http://projectvote.org/fileadmin/ProjectVote/Publications/Politics_of_Voter_Fr
aud_Final.pdf. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. See SPENCER OVERTON, STEALING DEMOCRACY: THE NEW POLITICS OF VOTER 
SUPPRESSION (2007).  See generally DENNIS F. THOMPSON, JUST ELECTIONS: CREATING A 
FAIR ELECTORAL PROCESS IN THE UNITED STATES (2002) (presenting discussions of 
vote suppression and manufacturing techniques). 
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Even within the category of voter fraud it is important to 
realize that a host of activities can be included under this term.  
Voter fraud could include intentional efforts to register falsely to 
vote or actually to vote falsely. Allegations of voter fraud include 
claims that illegal immigrants, ex-felons, and impersonators are 
stealing the identities of others, including the dead, in order to 
vote illegally.74  Voter fraud could also take place in several venues, 
like the election-day polls, in completing absentee ballots, or in 
completing the paperwork necessary to register to vote.  Given 
these distinctions, the evidence is clear: there is little systematic or 
widespread voter fraud in the United States that is changing the 
outcome of elections.  This is at least true among the types of fraud 
that voter ID laws are meant to address. 
The three most persistent claims of voter fraud come from the 
Wall Street Journal’s John Fund, a report from the Senate Republican 
Policy Committee in Congress, and the Carter-Baker Report.  
Fund’s Stealing Elections75 calls for mandatory photo identification to 
be displayed when voting to counteract widespread fraud occurring 
in the United States.  Yet what evidence is there that voter fraud is 
rampant?  Fund offers little.  Stealing Elections draws upon interviews 
around the country to whip up hysteria that droves of dead people, 
illegal immigrants, vote brokers, and ex-felons are cheating their 
way into voting booths, stealing elections from honest decent 
Republicans, and diluting the votes of red, white, and blue 
Americans.  But when the smoke from Fund’s allegations clears, 
there is little voter fraud fire, at least of the kind he alleges. 
For example, Fund alleges that the Florida 2000 presidential 
election demonstrated “sloppiness that makes fraud and foul-ups in 
election counts possible . . . .”76  Even if one accepts all of his 
comments as true, the sloppiness he alleges is not voter fraud; the 
problems are with election officials.  Fund also alleges that “lax 
standards for registration encouraged by the Motor Voter Act have 
left the voter rolls in a shambles in many states.”77  Again, this mere 
allegation does not document which states, define what shambles 
means, or describe how the problems affect voting or whether 
     74.  See Craig C. Donsanto, Prosecution of Electoral Fraud Under States Federal 
Law, 1558 PLI/CORP 655 (2006).  
 75. JOHN FUND, STEALING ELECTIONS: HOW VOTER FRAUD THREATENS OUR 
DEMOCRACY (2004). 
 76. Id. at 3–4. 
 77. Id. at 25. 
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those problems constitute voter fraud.  Stealing Elections is rife with 
these types of unsubstantiated allegations of election fraud, let 
alone voter fraud, that Fund claims have actually risen to a level 
that affects elections.  Fund seems only to offer anecdotal evidence 
that election officials have erred in letting some individuals register 
when they should not have or that a few persons have  tried to vote 
twice in the same election, such as showing up to the polls to vote 
after forgetting they voted by absentee ballot. Fund, in a recent op-
ed,78 seems not to have learned the errors of his ways.  In that Wall 
Street Journal essay he referenced a felon named Ben Miller in 
Florida who voted illegally for the last sixteen years, and mentioned 
that in the Florida 2000 election there were 5643 voters’ names that 
“perfectly matched the names of convicted felons.”79  But what 
Fund does not say or apparently seek to investigate or prove is 
whether Ben Miller knew he was ineligible to vote or whether 
election officials incorrectly registered him.  And of the 5643 
names, Fund fails to show that these individuals were barred from 
voting or that they were doing anything wrong.  Ex-felons, after all, 
are not barred from voting in all states and in all circumstances as 
Fund’s insinuations would imply.80  For the most part, Fund’s 
allegations are based upon rumor, half-truths, and innuendos that 
fail the test of any valid social science study. 
A second report by the Senate Republican Policy Committee, 
entitled Putting an End to Voter Fraud,81 asserts that “[v]oter fraud 
continues to plague our nation’s federal elections . . . .”82  The basis 
of its allegations rests in assertions that the National Voter 
Registration Act of 199383 has made it difficult to maintain accurate 
lists to keep people from voting illegally,84 that non-citizens are 
voting illegally,85 and that there may be risks associated with early 
and absentee voting.86  Again, little evidence of voter fraud, either 
of a substantive or systematic nature, is offered.  For example, the 
     78. See John Fund, Editorial, Vote-Fraud Demagogues, WALL ST. J., June 13, 2007, 
at A19. 
     79. Id. 
     80.    25 AM. JUR. 2D Elections § 174 (2007).  
 81. UNITED STATES SENATE REPUBLICAN POLICY COMMITTEE, PUTTING AN END TO 
VOTER FRAUD (2005), http://rpc.senate.gov/_files/Feb1504VoterFraudSD.pdf. 
 82. Id. at 1. 
 83. National Voter Registration Act (Motor Voter Act) of 1993, 42 U.S.C.               
§ 1973gg-gg-10 (2000 & Supp. 2007). 
 84. UNITED STATES SENATE REPUBLICAN POLICY COMMITTEE, supra note 81, at 5. 
 85. Id. at 7. 
 86. Id. at 8. 
14
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 2 [2008], Art. 2
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol34/iss2/2
2. SCHULTZ - ADC.DOC.DOCM 1/31/2008  10:30:03 AM 
2008] THE MYTH OF VOTER FRAUD 497 
                                                          
report cites allegations of illegal voting in the 2004 Wisconsin 
presidential elections87 but provides no firm numbers to show if the 
allegations are true or significant.  In terms of the threat of non-
citizens voting, the report mainly references efforts in many 
jurisdictions to change the law to allow non-citizens to vote legally.88
Those who argue that there is widespread voter fraud 
requiring new measures such as voter IDs often cite a third report 
entitled Building Confidence in U.S. Elections: Report of the Commission 
on Federal Election Reform,89 which was chaired by former president 
Jimmy Carter and former Secretary of State James Baker (“Carter-
Baker Commission”).90  The report asserts that “while election 
fraud is difficult to measure, it occurs.”91  Proof of this assertion is 
citation to 180 Department of Justice investigations resulting in 
convictions of fifty-two individuals from October 2002 until the 
release of the report.92  Yet while the Carter-Baker Commission 
called for voter photo IDs, it also noted that “there is no evidence 
of extensive fraud in U.S. elections, or of multiple voting, but both 
occur, and it could affect the outcome of a close election.”93  As 
with other studies, absentee voting is singled out as the place where 
fraud is most likely to occur, followed by registration drives by third 
parties.94
Empirical evidence supporting the Carter-Baker Commission 
findings of fraud is scant at best.  As noted, the report concludes 
that fraud is not extensive, but when the report cites to support its 
claims, it references newspaper articles and other accounts that are 
not corroborated or subject to critical analysis.95  As the Brennan 
Center stated in its analysis and response to the Carter-Baker call 
for a voter photo ID: “[T]he Report attempts to support its 
burdensome identification requirements on four specific examples 
of purported fraud or potential fraud.  None of the Report’s cited 
 87. Id. at 7. 
 88. Id. 
 89. CENTER FOR DEMOCRACY AND ELECTION MANAGEMENT, AMERICAN 
UNIVERSITY, BUILDING CONFIDENCE IN U.S. ELECTIONS: REPORT OF THE COMMISSION 
ON FEDERAL ELECTION REFORM (2005) [hereinafter Carter-Baker Commission], 
http://www.american.edu/ia/cfer/report/full_report.pdf. 
 90. Id. at 18 (calling for voter IDs when voting). 
 91. Id. at 45. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. at 46. 
 95. See Carter-Baker Commission, supra note 89, at 18, 73 n.19 (citing to 
Section 1.1 of the report). 
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examples of fraud stand up under closer scrutiny.”96  Even if all of 
the documented accounts of fraud were true, the Brennan Center 
points out that in the state of Washington, for example, six cases of 
double voting and nineteen instances of individuals voting in the 
name of the dead yielded twenty-five fraudulent votes out of 
2,812,675 cast—a 0.0009% rate of fraud.97  Also, assume the fifty-
two convictions by the Department of Justice are accurate instances 
of fraud.  This means that fifty-two out of 196,139,871 ballots cast in 
federal elections, or .00003% of the votes were fraudulent.98  While 
critics might assert that these cases represent only the tip of the 
iceberg, it is important to underscore that prosecutions occurred 
on the heels of the Justice Department taking an aggressive stance 
on this crime.99  There is a greater chance of one being hit by 
lightning than of an election being affected by fraud.100
While studies seeking to prove voter fraud offer a paucity of 
evidence, studies reaching the opposite conclusion are more 
plentiful.  The United States Elections Assistance Commission 
(“EAC”) undertook a broad review of literature and expert 
interviews on what was then known about voter fraud when the 
EAC was operating, creating the report Election Crimes: An Initial 
Review and Recommendations for Future Study.101  It concluded that 
“[m]any of the allegations made in the reports and books . . . were 
not substantiated[,]” even though they were often cited by many 
parties as evidence of fraud.102  The report held that the same was 
true regarding media accounts103 and that even stories about 
prosecutions lacked reliable follow up.104  Overall, the report noted 
that while “impersonation of voters is probably the least frequent 
type of fraud because it is the most likely type of fraud to be 
discovered, there are stiff penalties associated with this type of 
fraud, and it is an inefficient method of influencing an election.”105  
Instead of impersonation, absentee ballot voting was described as 
 96. WENDY WEISER ET AL., RESPONSE TO THE REPORT OF THE 2005 COMMISSION 
ON FEDERAL ELECTION REFORM 9 (2005) (emphasis omitted). 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. at 10. 
 99. Eric Lipton & Ian Urbina, In 5-Year Effort, Scant Evidence of Voter Fraud, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 12, 2007, at A1, available at 2007 WLNR 6949847. 
 100. WEISER, supra note 96, at 10. 
 101. U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMMISSION, supra note 68, at 2–3. 
 102. Id. at 16. 
 103. See id. 
 104. See id. at 16–19. 
 105. Id. at 9. 
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most susceptible to voter fraud,106 but, even with it, the EAC called 
for more statistical analysis to determine its seriousness.107
But even as this version of the EAC report downplayed voter 
fraud while calling for more study of the subject, the original draft 
was more conclusive in dismissing allegations.  According to the 
New York Times, “a federal panel, the Election Assistance 
Commission, reported last year that the pervasiveness of fraud was 
debatable. That conclusion played down findings of the consultants 
who said there was little evidence of it across the country, according 
to a review of the original report.”108  As reported in the New York 
Times, experts hired by the EAC to consult with them largely found 
that mistakes and errors by election officials—as well honest 
mistakes by voters—have caused some problems.109  Yet overall, 
according to Richard G. Frohling, assistant United States attorney 
in Milwaukee, “[t]here was nothing that we uncovered that 
suggested some sort of concerted effort to tilt the election . . . .”110  
In effect, while the final version of the EAC report seemed tentative 
in dismissing fraud as a phenomenon, the experts and perhaps 
even the original version of the report were even more conclusive 
on this point. 
Lorraine Minnite has conducted several studies on the extent 
of voter fraud in the United States.111  One of those studies cites 
statistics provided by the Department of Justice, indicating that 
between 2002 and 2005, when the Attorney General made election 
fraud and corruption a priority, only twenty-six individuals were 
convicted or pled guilty to illegal voting.  The twenty-six individuals 
included five who could not vote because of felony convictions, 
fourteen non-citizens, and five who voted twice in the same 
election.112  During that same time period, another fourteen 
individuals were prosecuted but not convicted by the Justice 
Department.113  Minnite has also noted how states have heavily 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. at 18–19. 
 108. Lipton & Urbina, supra note 99. 
 109. See id.  
 110. Id. 
 111. MINNITE, supra note 69. 
 112. LORRAINE C. MINNITE, AN ANALYSIS OF VOTER FRAUD IN THE U.S. 11 (2007), 
http://www.demos.org/pubs/analysis_voter_fraud.pdf.  This is a later version of 
the original Minnite study that reached the same conclusions.  References in this 
article are to the original study. 
 113. Id. 
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criminalized voter fraud,114 and local law enforcement officials do 
not seem to be shying away from election fraud issues as a result of 
a lack of desire, ability, or resources to combat fraud.115  Moreover, 
when Minnite examined the often told allegations of illegal voting 
or registration in Wisconsin during the 2004 presidential race, she 
found that either the individuals did not know they voted illegally, 
that the stories were later recanted, or that prosecutions (a total of 
three) were dropped due to a lack of evidence.116  Minnite 
concluded that voter fraud allegations are really partisan 
Republican efforts to suppress voting.117
Other studies have reached similar conclusions about the lack 
of voter fraud.  While some, such as the Republican Senate Policy 
Committee, express concern that the Motor Voter Act is a potential 
source of voter fraud, an EAC report on the law’s impact did not 
discuss fraud.118  In the report, voter fraud is not discussed in the 
section on voter verification.119  In fact, the report seems to suggest 
that states have this issue under control.  The problem getting the 
most attention is removal from voter rolls for non-voting.120  An 
Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights report found 
only isolated reports of voter fraud or impersonation.121  Additional 
analysis on the impact of the Motor Voter Act by Jonathan E. 
Davis,122 the Carter-Baker report,123 and a Rutgers University study 
of the impact of provisional voting procedures as outlined in the 
 114. Id. at 9. 
 115. Id. 
 116. MINNITE, supra note 69, at 32–35. 
 117. Id. at 36. 
 118. U.S. ELECTIONS ASSISTANCE COMMISSION, THE IMPACT OF THE NATIONAL 
VOTER  REGISTRATION ACT OF 1993 ON THE ADMINISTRATION OF ELECTIONS FOR 
FEDERAL OFFICE 2005–2006:  A REPORT TO THE 110TH CONGRESS (June 30, 2007), 
available at http://projectvote.org/fileadmin/ProjectVote/Publications/EAC_NV 
RArpt2006.pdf. 
 119. Id. at 12. 
 120. Id. at 11. 
 121. OFFICE FOR DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS , UNITED STATES 
OF AMERICA MID-TERM CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS 7 NOVEMBER 2006:  
OSCE/ODIHR ELECTION ASSESSMENT MISSION REPORT 16 (Mar. 9, 2007), available 
at http://www.osce.org/documents/odihr/2007/03/23567_en.pdf. 
 122. Jonathan E. Davis, The National Voter Registration Act of 1993:  Debunking 
States' Rights Resistance and the Pretense of Voter Fraud, 6 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 
117, 135–37 (1997). 
 123. Spencer Overton, Voter Identification, 105 MICH. L. REV. 631, 648 (2007). 
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Help America Vote Act of 2002124 also found little if any evidence of 
fraud in American elections. 
Overall, despite some episodic and sporadic accounts, the best 
available evidence shows that voter fraud is a minor issue in 
American elections.  There is little hard evidence that it occurs, 
even less evidence that it is widespread, and almost no indication 
that it has altered election outcomes. 
C. Assessing the Impact of New Voting Requirements 
In addition to a lack of evidence about voting fraud, one can 
also assess the impact of new election procedures by examining 
how they affect decisions to vote. 
Political scientists have long noted how decisions to register 
and vote are affected by numerous variables, including income, 
age, and generation.125  Social capital and trust may also have an 
impact.126  In general, the more barriers placed in front of potential 
voters, such as decreased time allotments to register to vote, the less 
likely they are to vote.127  The same is true with voter ID laws.  They 
impose a cost on citizens that may make it less likely that they will 
vote.  At least three studies discussed below substantiate this claim. 
First, Timothy Vercellotti and David Anderson examined the 
likely impact of voter ID laws across the United States.  They found 
that photo ID laws would reduce the probability of voting by 3.7% 
 124. See generally EAGLETON INSTITUTE OF POLITICS CENTER FOR PUBLIC INTEREST 
POLLING, APPENDIX A: NATIONAL SURVEY OF LOCAL ELECTION OFFICIALS’ EXPERIENCES 
WITH PROVISIONAL VOTING (July-Aug. 2005), available at http://www.eagleton. 
rutgers.edu/NewsResearch/AppendA_National_Survey_Local_Election_Officials.
pdf (surveying elections officials’ experiences with provisional voting). 
 125. See, e.g., WARREN E. MILLER & J. MERRILL SHANKS, THE NEW AMERICAN 
VOTER 88-90, 111 (1996) (discussing the New Deal and Post-New Deal 
generations).  See generally PAUL R. ABRAMSON, JOHN H. ALDRICH, & DAVID W. 
ROHDE, CHANGE AND CONTINUITY IN THE 2000 AND 2002 ELECTIONS (2003) 
(discussing voting behavior in the 2000 Presidential election); M. MARGARET 
CONWAY, POLITICAL PARTICIPATION IN THE UNITED STATES (1985) (discussing social 
and political characteristics of voting patterns); Expert Report and Affidavit of 
Marjorie R. Hershey,  Ind. Democratic Party v. Rokita, 2005 WL 4019117 (S.D. Ind. 
October 25, 2005) (providing a bibliography documenting this proposition). 
 126. ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF 
AMERICAN COMMUNITY 404–14 (2000). 
 127. RAYMOND E. WOLFINGER & STEVEN J. ROSENSTONE, WHO VOTES? 61–62 
(1980). 
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for whites, 6% for African-Americans, and nearly 10% for Hispanic-
Americans.128
Second, a study by the Brennan Center for Justice found that 
7% of the population lacked ready access to the citizenship type 
papers, such as passports and birth certificates that are necessary to 
vote, that 11% of the population does not have a government-
issued ID, and that low-income individuals are less likely to have the 
requisite identification to vote.129  The Brennan Center study 
indicates that the requirements, time, and money to secure a valid 
photo ID for voting imposed costs on certain populations that 
would discourage voting. 
Finally, Professor Marjorie Hershey prepared testimony130 as an 
expert witness for the plaintiffs in Indiana Democratic Party v. 
Rokita131 assessing the likely impact of a state’s new photo ID law on 
voter turnout.132  In developing her analysis, Hershey indicated that 
perhaps the dominant mode political scientists use to assess voting 
laws is a rational choice or economic model, which asks what costs 
are imposed by new procedures upon individuals deciding whether 
or not to vote.133  According to Hershey, “people are likely to vote as 
long as the perceived costs of voting do not outweigh the perceived 
benefits.”134  “Costs of voting” include time to register to vote, 
waiting times, financial and informational costs, registration laws, 
and physical barriers.135  Hershey provides in her affidavit ample 
empirical evidence from political scientists to demonstrate that as 
the costs of voting increase, registration and turnout decrease.136  
Overall, her argument is that photo ID requirements for voting are 
 128. Timothy Vercellotti & David Anderson, Protecting the Franchise or Restricting 
it?  The Effect of Voter Identification Requirements on Turnout 13 (Aug. 31–Sept. 3, 
2006), available at http://www.brennancenter.org/dynamic/subpages/download_ 
file_50903.pdf. 
 129. Brennan Center for Justice, Citizens Without Proof: A Survey of Americans’ 
Possession of Documentary Proof of Citizenship and Photo Identification 2–3 (Nov. 2006), 
http://www.brennancenter.org/dynamic/subpages/download_file_39242.pdf. 
 130. Hershey aff., supra note 125. 
 131. 458 F. Supp. 2d 775 (S.D. Ind. 2006). 
 132. Hershey aff., supra note 125, at *1. 
 133. Id. at *3. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. at *3–4. 
 136. Id. at *6–8.  For example, Hershey references studies showing how 
improvements in transportation in the nineteenth century had a dramatic increase 
in voter turnout.  Id. at *6.  Also, she notes how political scientists have concluded 
that "[r]egistration raises the costs of voting.”  Id. at *7. 
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a definite cost,137 especially for some groups such as the poor,138 
those without government-issued IDs, and people of color.139
Taken together, these three studies, along with other political 
and social science literature, demonstrate that new voting 
requirements, such as photo IDs, impose costs on citizens deciding 
to go to the polls.  These costs are likely to impact voting negatively.  
Combine these studies with those that examine voter fraud in the 
United States and the conclusion becomes obvious: voter ID laws 
are not neutral.  Not only is there negligible (at best) evidence of 
voter fraud to support the necessity of voter ID laws, but these laws 
are also negative because they might actually suppress real voter 
turnout by imposing additional burdens on voters. 
IV. STATE PHOTO ID LITIGATION 
Evidence and potential impact notwithstanding, several states 
have recently enacted photo ID laws for voting.  In cases arising out 
of Indiana,140  Michigan,141 Georgia,142 and Arizona,143 courts have 
upheld the photo ID voting laws, while similar laws in Missouri144 
and in New Mexico145 have been struck down.  Critical to the 
decisions in these cases was the attitude of the courts towards both 
the standard of review required to evaluate the ID law and the level 
of deference and recognition given to the purported evidence of 
voter fraud. 
A. Indiana and Crawford v. Marion County Election Board 
At issue in Crawford v. Marion County Election Board146 was an 
Indiana law mandating that “persons wanting to vote in person in 
either a primary or a general election must present at the polling 
 137. Id. at *4. 
 138. Id. at *6. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 472 F.3d 949 (7th Cir. 2007). 
 141. In re Request for Advisory Opinion Regarding Constitutionality of 2005 
PA 71, 479 Mich. 1 (2007). 
 142. Common Cause/Georgia v. Billups, 504 F. Supp. 2d 1333 (N.D.Ga. 2007). 
 143. Gonzalez v. Arizona, 485 F.3d 1041 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 144. Weinschenk v. State, 203 S.W.3d 201 (Mo. 2006). 
 145. Women Voters of Albuquerque/Bernalillo County, Inc. v. Santillanes, 506 
F.Supp.2d 598 (D.N.M. 2007). 
 146. 472 F.3d 929, 950 (7th Cir. 2007). 
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place a government-issued photo ID,”147 unless voting in a nursing 
home or by absentee ballot.  Both the district court148 and the 
Seventh Circuit upheld the ID requirement. 
The challenge in Indiana Democratic Party v. Rokita was to the 
Senate Enrollment Act No. 483 (“SEA”)149 requiring voters to 
present a photo ID at the polls when voting.150  According to SEA, 
the identification was required to have: 
 (1) A photograph of the individual to whom the “proof 
of identification” was issued; (2) The name of the 
individual to whom the document was issued, which 
“conforms to the name in the individual’s voter 
registration record”; (3) An expiration date; (4) The 
identification must be current or have expired after the 
date of the most recent general election; and (5) The 
“proof of identification” must have been “issued by the 
United States or the state of Indiana.”151
The law was challenged as a facial violation of the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments, as well as a violation of various provisions 
of the Indiana Constitution.152  Voters lacking an acceptable ID 
would be subject to challenge by a member of a precinct election 
board but would have been allowed to file a provisional ballot and 
given an opportunity to prove eligibility and to have the ballot 
accepted if an acceptable photo was later produced before the 
clerk or the election board.153  The court recited a list of documents 
that would be considered acceptable and sufficient under state law 
to obtain the state-issued photo ID.154  In addition to the documents 
necessary to obtain the state-issued ID, there was a minimum $10 
fee that had to be paid.155
In order to justify the photo ID requirement the state 
contended that it needed to address voter fraud.156  But the state 
conceded that it “is not aware of any incidents or person 
attempting to vote, or voting, at a voting place with fraudulent or 
 147. Id. (citing IND. CODE ANN. §§ 3-5-2-40.5, 3-10-1-7.2, 3-11-8-25.1 (West 
2007)). 
 148. Ind. Democratic Party v. Rokita, 458 F. Supp. 2d 775 (S.D. Ind. 2006). 
 149. IND. CODE § 3-5-2-40.5 (2007). 
 150. Rokita, 458 F.  Supp. 2d at 782. 
 151. Id. at 786 (citing IND. CODE ANN. § 3-5-2-40.5). 
 152. Id. at 782. 
 153. Id. at 786–87. 
 154. Id. at 789–91. 
 155. Id. at 792. 
 156. Id. at 792–93. 
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otherwise false identification.”157  But, as the district court noted, 
the defendants in the case justified the voter ID requirement by 
stating:  
[E]ven though there is no evidence of voter fraud as such, 
there is significant inflation in the Indiana voter 
registration lists; and in any event, based on reports 
documenting cases of in-person voter [fraud] from other 
states . . . [d]efendants maintain that voter fraud is or 
should be a concern in Indiana.158
In terms of the inflated voter lists, the court noted, among 
other things, that “there were 4.3 million registered voters in 2004, 
while there were only 3 million residents who reported being 
registered, resulting in estimated inflation of 41.4%.”159  The court 
also pointed out that 35,699 of the Indiana registered voters are 
now deceased.160  Second, the state offered evidence of voter fraud 
in other jurisdictions, citing, among other sources, John Fund’s 
Stealing Elections and other instances of purported election 
corruption.161  The state and the court noted what appears to be a 
corrosive impact upon voter confidence in elections if fraud occurs, 
using among other sources both Stealing Elections and the Carter-
Baker Report, as well as public opinion surveys to support the 
photo ID requirement.162  Finally, in addition to searching for 
evidence of fraud, the court also assessed the evidence offered by 
the plaintiffs to demonstrate that costs and impact that SEA would 
have on voters.163  This evidence included the Hershey report and 
other surveys by groups in Indiana,164 and another expert study, 
called the Brace Report, which documented a potential 989,000 
voters in the state that did not have the required state-issued ID.165  
The court largely ignored the Hershey report and rejected 
introduction of the Brace Report as unreliable under the Federal 
Rules of Evidence.166
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. at 792. 
 159. Id. at 793. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. at 794.  Specifically, the surveys are used to show that large majorities 
of those polled support the presentation of photo IDs when voting. Id. 
 163. Id. at 794–96. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. at 803. 
 166. Id. 
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In terms of the substantive legal analysis challenging SEA,167 
the court began by noting that the right to vote is fundamental, but 
then it shifted to Burdick in declaring that it is not an absolute 
right.168  The court again referenced Burdick in noting that not all 
regulations of the right to vote impose the same burdens; those 
imposing lesser burdens deserve lesser scrutiny.169  The court, 
following Burdick, rejected the application of strict scrutiny to SEA 
because not every voting regulation required that level of analysis, 
even if it resulted in denying some people the right to vote.170  In 
addition, the court rejected the notion that the photo ID 
requirement is a severe burden under Burdick (therefore triggering 
strict scrutiny) because the plaintiffs, while showing a burden in 
securing the ID, did not show a severe burden in actually voting.171  
In using the lower standard of review as dictated by Burdick, 
the court indicated that the test was to  
weigh ‘the character and magnitude of the asserted injury 
to the rights protected by the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments that the plaintiff seeks to vindicate’ against 
‘the precise interests put forward by the State as 
justifications for the burden imposed by its rule,’ taking 
into consideration ‘the extent to which those interests 
make it necessary to burden the plaintiff’s rights.172   
 Thus, the court balanced the state’s interest in preventing 
fraud against the plaintiffs’ voting rights.173  Here, the court found 
no evidence of a significant burden on voting, specifically pointing 
out that the plaintiffs could not name a single person burdened by 
the new law.174  The court found that the Brace report was 
inadmissible or unreliable,175 ignored the Hershey study, and 
concluded that it is not difficult to obtain a photo ID.176  Overall, it 
 167. Id. at 809–20.  This article passes over the extensive discussion of 
plaintiffs’ standing found in these pages. 
 168. Id. at 820. 
 169. Id. at 821. 
 170. Id. at 822. 
 171. Id. at 822–23. 
 172. Id. at 821 (quoting Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434). 
 173. See id. at 825-26 (remarking that requiring a photo ID to vote was no 
different than similar requirements to cashing a check). 
 174. Id. at 822–23. 
 175. Id. at 823–24. 
 176. Id. at 824–25. 
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saw no evidence to outweigh the state’s interest,177 and therefore it 
upheld the law against the First and Fourteenth Amendment 
challenges.178
The Seventh Circuit opinion upheld and followed the district 
court analysis.  While noting initially that many people choose not 
to vote for a variety of reasons (and therefore presumably would 
not be burdened by the photo ID requirement),179 the court 
rejected the application of strict scrutiny, again preferring to use 
the weighing test articulated in Burdick when regulations do not 
impose a severe burden.180  As the court effectuated the balance: 
On the other side of the balance is voting fraud, 
specifically the form of voting fraud in which a person 
shows up at the polls claiming to be someone else-
someone who has left the district, or died, too recently to 
have been removed from the list of registered voters, or 
someone who has not voted yet on election day.181
This interest must be weighed against “the effect of requiring a 
photo ID in inducing eligible voters to disfranchise themselves. 
That effect, so far as the record reveals, is slight.”182  Given this 
balance and the fact that, according to the court, voter fraud is 
hard to detect and is often viewed as a minor, poorly prosecuted 
crime, it is reasonable for the state to require voter IDs, even if 
there is no evidence of such fraud in Indiana.183
There are several characteristics core to the opinions of both 
the district court and the Seventh Circuit.  First, the cases accepted 
that the state interest in preventing fraud was valid, even if no 
empirical evidence of false identity at the polls could be 
documented in the state.  As a fallback position, the courts 
contended that evidence from other jurisdictions was sufficient or 
that abating potential fraud was a permissible interest.  Second, the 
cases dismissed evidence of a significant burden on voting rights, 
finding that, at best, it was difficult but not impossible to get a state-
 177. Id. at 826.  The court rejected the assertion that the state had to provide 
empirical evidence of fraud to support its interest, but were there such a mandate, 
enough evidence from other jurisdictions existed to sustain it.  Id. 
 178. Id. at 830. 
 179. Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 472 F.3d 949, 951 (7th Cir. 
2007). 
 180. Id. at 952. 
 181. Id. at 953. 
 182. Id. at 952. 
 183. See id. at 953. 
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issued ID that would meet the requirements of SEA.  Third, 
because the burden was not significant, strict scrutiny was not 
required (following Burdick). Finally, weighing state interests 
against the slight burden of the photo ID, courts upheld the latter.  
Other cases likely to uphold state voter ID laws would probably 
include points similar to these. 
B. Michigan and In re Request for Advisory Opinion Regarding 
Constitutionality of 2005 PA 71 
The issue in Michigan was the state and federal 
constitutionality of 2005 PA 71, a state law that requires either 
presentation of a photo ID when voting or signing an affidavit 
stating that one does not have the required identification.184  The 
Michigan Supreme Court, in an advisory opinion, found the law to 
be constitutional under the Burdick balancing test.185
In 1996, the state adopted a voter photo identification law.186  
Before that law took effect, the Michigan Attorney General issued 
an advisory opinion concluding that, lacking evidence of 
substantial voter fraud in the state, the requirement was 
unconstitutional because it did not advance a compelling state 
interest.187  But as a result of events, such as those surrounding the 
2000 presidential election,188 the state reenacted the voter ID law in 
the form of 2005 PA 71. Upon request from the Michigan House of 
Representatives, which is permitted to ask for an advisory opinion, 
the Michigan Supreme Court invited briefs to determine the facial 
constitutionality of 2005 PA 71.189
As in the Indiana case, the Michigan Supreme Court began its 
analysis by declaring that the right to vote is fundamental but not 
absolute.190  The court noted that in the state’s constitution the 
Legislature was given the authority to “enact laws to preserve the purity 
of elections, to preserve the secrecy of the ballot, to guard against 
abuses of the elective franchise, and to provide for a system of voter 
 184. In re Request for Advisory Opinion Regarding Constitutionality of 2005 
PA 71, 740 N.W.2d 444, 449 (Mich. 2007). 
 185. Id. at 469 (citing Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428 (1992)). 
 186. Id. at 448. 
 187. Id. 
 188. Id. at 449 
 189. Id. 
 190. Id. at 450. 
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registration and absentee voting.”191  The court noted that the 
purpose of this constitutional language was to grant the state the 
power to prevent fraudulent voting.192  The Court also noted that 
under federal jurisprudence states were given the authority to 
regulate their own elections193 in order to prevent fraud and to 
protect the right of lawful voters to exercise their franchise.194
Thus, while the Michigan Supreme Court indicated that 
fundamental rights generally must be examined under strict 
scrutiny,195 the United States Supreme Court rejected that analysis 
as applied to election law, preferring instead the more “flexible 
standard” as articulated in Burdick.196  According to the Michigan 
Supreme Court, the first step is to determine 
the nature and magnitude of the claimed restriction 
inflicted by the election law on the right to vote, weighed 
against the precise interest identified by the state.  If the 
burden on the right to vote is severe, then the regulation 
must be “narrowly drawn” to further a compelling state 
interest. However, if the restriction imposed is reasonable 
and nondiscriminatory, then the law is upheld as 
warranted by the important regulatory interest identified 
by the state.197
The court quickly disposed of the burden question. It noted 
that the burden is slight: “[2005 PA 71] merely requires the 
presentation of photo identification that the voter already 
possesses.”198  The court stated that the Attorney General did not 
claim that the photo ID requirement burdens voters who already 
have an ID but merely that it might do so for those lacking the ID 
at present.199  The court quickly disposed of this objection by stating 
that the alternative to the photo ID is signing an affidavit, which 
itself is not burdensome.200  Hence, the court used the more 
flexible standard under Burdick to analyze the ID requirement.201
 
 191. Id. at 453 (quoting MICH. CONST. art. II, § 4). 
 192. Id. 
 193. Id. at 454 (citing inter alia, Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 433 (1992)). 
 194. Id. 
 195. Id. at 455. 
 196. Id. 
 197. Id. at 455–56. 
 198. Id. at 456. 
 199. Id. 
 200. Id. at 457. 
   201.    Id. at 469.  
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The court thus weighed the state’s constitutional interest in 
preventing fraud against what it perceived as the slight burden of 
the voter ID requirement.  It found that the article II, section 4 
state constitutional requirements to preserve the purity of the 
elections and to guard against abuses were compelling interests.202  
In addition, the court noted that the state was not required to 
provide empirical evidence of voter fraud and that instead it may 
take prophylactic action to prevent it.203  Even if some proof is 
demanded, however, the court said that in-person fraud is covert 
and hard to detect, and therefore it could not see how such proof 
could be undertaken.204  Thus, under the Burdick flexible standard, 
the Michigan Supreme Court upheld 2005 PA 71 against federal 
constitutional challenges205 and found that it was not a violation of 
the state constitution.206  Finally, similar to the Indiana case,207 the 
court rejected the claim that the photo ID was an unconstitutional 
poll tax, finding that no fee was required to vote, and that, in any 
event, there was an affidavit bypass.208
C.  Georgia and Common Cause/Georgia v. Billups 
In 2005, the Georgia Legislature adopted and the governor 
signed House Bill 244, or Act 53 (“HB 244”),209 requiring all 
registered voters in Georgia who vote at the polls in person to 
present a government-issued photo ID to election officials before 
being allowed to vote.210  Subsequently, the state adopted the 2006 
Photo ID Act (“the 2006 Act”), which repealed the 2005 
amendment and replaced it with nearly identical language.211  The 
one difference between the 2005 amendment and the 2006 Act was 
that the latter also required the Board of Elections in each county 
 202. Id. at 455. 
 203. Id. at 458. 
 204. Id. at 458 n.64. 
 205. Id. at 459. 
 206. Id. at 463. 
 207. See Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 472 F.3d 949, 952 (7th Cir. 
2007). 
 208. Constitutionality of 2005 PA 71, 740 N.W.2d at 466. 
 209. Common Cause/Ga. v. Billups, 504 F. Supp. 2d 1333, 1342 (N.D. Ga. 
2005).  HB 244 amended O.C.G.A. § 21-2-417, which did not require the 
production of a government-issued ID but instead allowed it among several other 
forms of proof of identification to be used when voting in person.  See GA. CODE 
ANN. § 21-2-417 (2007). 
 210. Common Cause/Ga., 504 F. Supp. 2d at 1342. 
 211. Id. 
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to issue a Georgia photo voter identification card without charge to 
voters upon presentation of certain identifying documents.212  This 
changed the law’s previous requirement that individuals complete 
an affidavit of indigency if they could not afford the ID.213  For 
individuals who did not have a state driver’s license, the 2006 Act 
also listed numerous other acceptable identifying documents, 
including passports and military or tribal IDs.214  Finally, the 2006 
Act also mandated that each county issue IDs for a minimum of 
eight hours each day of the week before election day.215
Common Cause Georgia, the NAACP, and several individuals 
challenged the 2006 Act as a violation of the Fourteenth and 
Twenty-Fourth Amendment rights to vote and as a poll tax.216  They 
also alleged various state constitutional claims and sought a 
preliminary injunction to halt enforcement of the law.217  Following 
a rather complicated history of litigation in both state and federal 
courts,218 a federal district court upheld the 2006 Act and rejected 
demands to enjoin its enforcement.219
In reviewing the case, the district court began its substantive 
legal analysis on the constitutionality of the 2006 Act by affirming 
that voting is a fundamental right.220  The court found that the 
right to vote is not absolute, but that the state cannot unduly 
burden that right.221  The question for the court was what test to use 
to determine an undue burden. After recounting several 
possibilities, it settled on the Burdick flexible standard approach.222  
 212. Id. 
 213. Id. at 1343; see also GA. CODE ANN. § 40-5-103 (2007). 
 214. Common Cause/Ga., 504 F. Supp. 2d at 1343. 
 215. Id. at 1346. 
 216. Id. at 1337–42. 
 217. Id  at 1337. 
 218. Id. at 1337–42. The Plaintiffs filed several complaints and amended 
motions for temporary and permanent injunctions.  Id. 
 219. Id. at 1382–83. 
 220. Common Cause/Ga. v. Billups, 504 F. Supp. 2d 1333, 1375 (N.D. Ga. 
2005).  
 221. Id. 
 222. Id. at 1376. 
The Court finds that the appropriate standard of review for evaluating 
the 2006 Photo ID Act is the Burdick sliding scale standard. Under that 
standard, the Court must weigh “the character and magnitude of the 
asserted injury to the rights protected by the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments that the plaintiff seeks to vindicate” against “the precise 
interests put forward by the State as justifications for the burden imposed 
29
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Interestingly, in arriving at this standard, the court implicitly 
rejected claims that the restriction of the 2006 Act’s ID 
requirement was severe, therefore making the more flexible 
weighing approach the appropriate standard for review.223
In terms of the State’s interests, the court noted that “[t]he 
State and the State Defendants assert that the 2006 Act’s photo ID 
requirement is designed to curb voting fraud.”224  In looking to 
ascertain instances of voter fraud in Georgia, the court’s findings of 
fact acknowledge statements by the Secretary of State that in the 
previous ten years the “office received no reports of voter 
impersonation involving a scenario in which a voter appeared at 
the polls and voted as another person, and the actual person later 
appeared at the polls and attempted to vote as himself.”225  The 
Secretary of State also declared that the “photo ID requirement for 
in-person voting was unnecessary, created a significant obstacle to 
voting for many voters,”226 and that absentee voting was the source 
of many of the problems.227  Despite these acknowledgments by the 
Secretary, the court dismissed them along with the need for the 
state to provide evidence of voting fraud.228  Instead, the court 
noted that because it was not applying strict scrutiny, the state did 
not have to offer empirical support and, moreover, “the legislature 
has wide latitude in determining the problems it wishes to address 
and the manner in which it desires to address them.”229
In weighing this state interest against the injury to the 
plaintiffs’ right to vote, the court noted that the burden to the 
latter is not severe.230  It noted that the ID is free,231 that each 
 
by its rule,” taking into consideration “the extent to which those interests 
make it necessary to burden the plaintiff's rights.” 
Id. at 1377 (citing Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 433–34 (1992). 
 223. Id. at 1377 (analyzing the two tier approach to voting regulations but then 
simply adopting the flexible standard without explaining why the burden is not 
severe). 
 224. Id. at 1381. 
 225. Id. at 1356. 
 226. Common Cause/Ga. v. Billups, 504 F. Supp. 2d 1333, 1357 (N.D. Ga. 
2005).  
 227. See id. 
 228. See id. at 1382. 
 229. Id. at 1381–82 (quoting Ind. Democratic Party v. Rokita, 458 F. Supp. 2d 
775, 829 (S.D. Ind. 2006)). 
 230. Id. at 1380. 
 231. Id. at 1379. 
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county has an office that is easily accessible to secure the ID,232 and 
that none of the plaintiffs who were granted standing would have 
difficulty securing the ID.233  It also pointed out that a public 
education program to inform voters about the ID requirements was 
aimed at mitigating the burdens.234  Thus, the court refused to 
grant the injunction.235
D. Arizona and Gonzalez v. Arizona 
Gonzalez v. Arizona236 is the fourth instance where the courts 
have decided to permit states to go forward with an ID law.  At issue 
here was an ID law enacted as Proposition 200 via a ballot initiative 
in 2004.237  Proposition 200 required “persons wishing to register to 
vote for the first time in Arizona to present proof of citizenship and 
to require all Arizona voters to present identification when they 
vote in person at the polls.”238  A coalition of groups challenged it, 
claiming the measure was a poll tax that violated the Fourteenth 
Amendment Equal Protection Clause and the right to vote; they 
also claimed that it violated the Voting Rights Act.239  The plaintiffs 
sought to enjoin enforcement of Proposition 200 before the 2006 
election and were initially rejected by a federal district court240 
which rejected the parallels between an ID and a poll tax.241  The 
court also indicated that the factual record necessary to show a 
burden on voting rights had not been developed.242  The Ninth 
Circuit reversed and granted the injunction,243 but the Supreme 
Court vacated the stay and remanded the case back to the court of 
appeals.244  In its reasoning, the Supreme Court noted that while 
the right to vote was important, so too was addressing voter fraud; it 
also noted that the Ninth Circuit had failed to give reasons for why  
 232. See id. at 1343.  
 233. Id. at 1379. 
 234. Id. at 1380. 
 235. Id.  at 1383. 
 236. 485 F.3d 1041 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 237. Id. at 1046. 
 238. Id. 
 239. Id. 
 240. Gonzalez v. Ariz., No. CV 06-1268-PHX, 2006 WL 3627297 (D. Ariz. Sept. 
11, 2006). 
 241. Id. at *4–5. 
 242. Gonzalez v. Ariz., 485 F.3d 1041, 1048 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 243. Id. at 1046. 
 244. Purcell v. Gonzalez, 127 S. Ct. 5, 8 (2006). 
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it reversed the lower court.245  On remand, the Ninth Circuit 
upheld the district court’s denial of preliminary injunctive relief.246
In upholding the photo ID law, the Ninth Circuit quickly 
rejected the poll tax argument by distinguishing showing 
identification from paying a fee.247  In the Virginia case Harman v. 
Forssenius,248 the right to vote was “abridged . . . by reason of failure 
to pay the poll tax.”249  In Arizona, however, voters need only show 
proof of citizenship, which does not constitute a form of poll tax.250  
Next, the court, drawing upon Burdick, indicated that they need not 
use strict scrutiny in this case because the plaintiffs failed to show 
how the ID requirement imposed a severe burden upon the right 
to vote.251  Thus, examining Proposition 200 under the more 
flexible Burdick standard, the court found that four affidavits of 
individuals claiming to be burdened by the photo ID law were 
insufficient or inappropriate to show the hardship claimed.252  
Since the plaintiffs were unable to provide a record to show the 
alleged harms, the Ninth Circuit upheld the decision of the district 
court to deny the injunction.253
E. Missouri and Weinschenk v. Missouri 
Among the initial challenges to photo ID laws, Weinschenk v. 
Missouri254 was the only decision invaliding this voting requirement 
using strict scrutiny.  At issue was SB 1014, a Missouri photo ID 
requirement, adopted in 2006.255  SB 1014 amended state law, 
mandating that as a condition of voting “Missourians present as 
identification a document issued by the state or federal 
governments that contains the person’s name as listed in the voter 
registration records, the person’s photograph, and an expiration 
date showing that the ID is not expired.”256  According to the 
 245. Id. at 7–8. 
 246. See Gonzalez, 485 F.3d at 1047. 
 247. Id. at 1049. 
 248. 380 U.S. 528 (1965). 
 249. Id. at 529. 
 250. Gonzalez, 485 F.3d at 1049. 
 251. Id. at 1049–50. 
 252. See id. at 1050–51. 
 253. See id. at 1052. 
 254. 203 S.W.3d 201 (Mo. 2006). 
 255. See id. at 205. 
 256. Id. (citing MO. REV. STAT. § 115.427.1 (Supp. 2006)). 
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Missouri Supreme Court, the change in the law effectively meant 
that for most residents, only a state-issued driver’s or non-driver’s 
license or United States passport would be considered an 
acceptable ID.257  Voters challenged SB 1014 as a poll tax, both as 
First and Fourteenth Amendment claims, and as a violation of 
various provisions of the Missouri Constitution.258  The Missouri 
Supreme Court sustained the challenges. 
Two points are critical to the decision in Weinschenk that 
distinguish it from the other cases upholding voter ID laws.  First, 
the court noted that the case 
stands in stark contrast to the Georgia and Indiana cases, 
for their decisions were largely based on those courts’ 
findings that the parties had simply presented theoretical 
arguments and had failed to offer specific evidence of 
voters who were required to bear these costs in order to 
exercise their right to vote.259
In this case, plaintiffs provided the empirical evidence to show 
the actual burden that the ID would cause.  They documented the 
real costs in terms of what it would take to obtain proper 
identification to vote.260  Specifically, the court noted that in some 
cases, the plaintiffs would have to pay $11 for a non-driver’s license 
and up to $20 for a birth certificate.261  Documenting real costs 
proved an actual burden; thus, the court was convinced that the 
severe burdens test as mandated in Burdick had been met.262  
Second, the court emphasized that notwithstanding Burdick, the 
photo ID requirement must be examined under the Missouri State 
Constitution, which appeared to offer more protection for the right 
to vote than found under the federal Constitution.263  The 
combination of empirical documentation and appeal to state 
constitutional law led the court to reach conclusions contrary to 
the decisions in Indiana, Georgia, Michigan, and Arizona. 
In its analysis of SB 1014, the Missouri court highlighted 
several burdens that the law imposed upon its citizens.  First, it 
noted that: 
 257. Id. at 205–06. 
 258. See id. at 204. 
 259. Id. at 214. 
   260.    Id. at 206–10.  
 261. Id. at 208. 
 262. See id. at 216. 
 263. See id. at 212–14. 
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[B]etween 3 and 4 percent of Missouri citizens lack the 
requisite photo ID and would, thus, need to obtain a 
driver’s or non-driver’s license or a passport in order to 
vote. Specifically, the trial court noted that the Secretary 
of State’s analysis in August 2006 estimated that 
approximately 240,000 registered voters may not have the 
required photo ID and that the Department of Revenue’s 
estimate of the same was approximately 169,215 
individuals.  Each of these forms of ID, however, normally 
costs money to obtain. This presents a practical problem 
for Missourians who will be discouraged from attempting 
to vote because of concern that they must pay a fee to do 
so.264
In calculating how many lacked current IDs, the court could 
rely upon statistics that did not seem in dispute, unlike in Indiana 
where the record was unclear as to how many individuals would be 
burdened by the new ID requirement.265  Second, as noted above, 
the court was able to attach real dollar costs to securing 
identification; e.g., fees for driver’s and non-driver’s licenses and 
birth certificates.266  Third, the court considered non-monetary 
costs, such as time and ability to navigate bureaucracies in order to 
obtain the necessary identification to vote,267 an especially difficult 
process for the elderly and handicapped.268  In addition, the court 
noted the burden the law would place upon those born out of state 
seeking to obtain the required birth certificate necessary to obtain 
the approved ID.269
The Missouri Supreme Court showed several instances where 
obtaining a driver’s or non-driver’s license would cost time, effort, 
and money.   
Nevertheless, under the new law these eligible registered 
voters will not be able to cast a regular ballot (or after 
2008 any ballot at all) unless they undertake to obtain one 
of the requisite photo IDs.  This will constitute a dramatic 
increase in provisional ballots over the previous law, as 
only 8,000 provisional ballots were cast statewide in the 
2004 general election.  As conceded by Appellants, denial 
 264. Id. at 206. 
   265.    Id. at 214 n.21. 
 266. See id. at 206, 214. 
 267. See id. at 215. 
 268. See id. 
 269. Id. at 211. 
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of the right to vote to these Missourians is more than a de 
minimis burden on their suffrage.270
Thus, the court was able to document the real costs and 
burdens to Missourian voters associated with the new ID 
requirement.  These costs, for the court, were sufficient for it to 
find that the photo ID requirement was an unconstitutional poll 
tax.271
Next, applying strict scrutiny, the court mandated that the 
state show a narrowly tailored compelling interest to support SB 
1014.272  The court conceded that although combating fraud is 
compelling,273 the state failed to make that demonstration.  First, 
the state could not show that recent elections had serious problems 
with fraud.274  Second, the fraud that did exist was not associated 
with voter impersonation but with absentee voting.275  Instead, 
according to the court: 
To the contrary, Appellants concede that the only type of 
voter fraud that the Photo-ID Requirement prevents is in-
person voter impersonation fraud at the polling place.  It 
does not address absentee voting fraud or fraud in 
registration. While the Photo-ID Requirement may 
provide some additional protection against voter 
impersonation fraud, the evidence below demonstrates 
that the Photo-ID Requirement is not “necessary” to 
accomplish this goal. As the trial court found: “No 
evidence was presented that voter impersonation fraud 
exists to any substantial degree in Missouri. In fact, the 
evidence that was presented indicates that voter 
impersonation fraud is not a problem in Missouri.”276
Thus, while the interest in addressing fraud is compelling, the 
lack of evidence for the type of fraud to be remedied by the ID 
requirement meant that the state’s interest was neither narrowly 
 270. Id. at 213. 
 271. Id. at 214–15. 
 272. See id. at 215–16. 
 273. Id. at 217. 
 274. Id. at 210 (stating that “the record contains two letters written in 2004 by 
then-Secretary of State Matt Blunt on the subject of voter fraud.  He described 
Missouri's statewide elections in 2002 and 2004 to then-Governor Bob Holden as 
‘two of the cleanest and problem free elections in recent history.’ To the St. Louis 
Post-Dispatch, Blunt characterized the same elections as ‘fraud-free.’”). 
 275. Id. at 218 n.28. 
 276. Id. at 217. 
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tailored nor compelling enough to survive strict scrutiny.277  Hence, 
SB 1014 was found to be unconstitutional under state 
constitutional clauses.278
F.  Albuquerque, New Mexico and Women Voters of 
Albuquerque/Bernalillo County v. Santillanes 
American Civil Liberties Union of New Mexico v. Santillanes279 is a 
second case where a court struck down a photo ID requirement.  
But unlike Weinschenk, where state constitutional law and strict 
scrutiny were used, the federal district court in Santillanes employed 
the U.S. Constitution and the flexible standard under Burdick to 
invalidate the requirement. 
At issue in Santillanes was a 2005 amendment to the City of 
Albuquerque, New Mexico Election Code mandating that its 
citizens present a valid photo ID when voting at the polls in future 
municipal elections.280  The requirement excluded absentee ballots, 
and it was adopted, according to the city, to address voter fraud.281  
The plaintiffs sought an injunction to bar enforcement of the 
amendment, contending that the photo ID requirement was an 
unconstitutional burden on voting rights.282  The district court 
judge agreed, granting an injunction under both First and 
Fourteenth Amendment (Equal Protection) grounds.283
Judge Armijo began her analysis of the 2005 amendment by 
noting that the case involved striking a balance between the right 
to vote and the city’s right to regulate elections in order to prevent 
voter fraud.284  Judge Armijo recognized that voting was a 
fundamental right under both the state and federal constitutions.285  
The plaintiffs called for strict scrutiny based on voting as a 
fundamental right.286  But the Court agreed with Burdick’s 
requirement to base the level of scrutiny upon the severity of the 
   277.    Id. at 217–19.  
 278. Id. at 221–22. 
 279. 506 F. Supp. 2d 598 (D.N.M. 2007). 
 280. Id. at 606 (addressing the constitutionality of Albuquerque, N.M., City 
Charter art. XIII, §14 (amended 2005)). 
 281. Id. 
 282. Id. 
 283. See id. at 645. 
 284. Id. at 606. 
 285. Id. at 627. 
 286. Id. at 626. 
36
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 2 [2008], Art. 2
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol34/iss2/2
2. SCHULTZ - ADC.DOC.DOCM 1/31/2008  10:30:03 AM 
2008] THE MYTH OF VOTER FRAUD 519 
                                                          
burden imposed.287  Similarly, the judge rejected the use of a 
rational basis test to examine the 2005 amendment, finding that 
the inability to predict the actual injury to voting rights requires 
more than a minimal level of analysis.288  Hence, the district court 
interpreted the Burdick test to require a more intermediate level of 
analysis, balancing the state interest against the severity of the 
burden on voting rights.289
By employing this test, the court agreed that preventing voter 
fraud is a compelling or important governmental interest.290  The 
court rejected the notion that simple assertion of this interest will 
suffice. 
[T]he Burdick test does not call for the Court to look for 
any conceivable, generalized interest that might serve as a 
justification for imposing a burden on the exercise of First 
and Fourteenth Amendment rights in the context of 
elections.  Rather, this test calls for the City to put forward 
“the precise interests [which serve] as justifications for the 
burden imposed by its rule,” taking into consideration 
“the extent to which those interests make it necessary to 
burden the plaintiff’s rights.”291
As the court interpreted the Burdick test, the weighing of state 
interests and the burden on voting rights required the city to “bear 
the burden of providing a reasoned explanation, supported by at 
least some admissible evidence, to show the October 2005 
amendment is tailored to advance an important governmental 
interest.”292  The judge noted that the 2005 Amendment referred 
only to one instance of alleged voter impersonation, but otherwise, 
no admissible evidence was put forward to support its contentions 
of voter fraud.293  Furthermore, the court responded to claims, as 
similarly made by Indiana, that the law should be upheld as a valid 
measure to prevent the possibility of fraud.294  Yet unlike in Indiana, 
where the state conceded that it was not up to date in maintenance 
of its voter-registration rolls, there was no indication or argument 
 287. Id. at 628. 
 288. Id. at 626. 
 289. Id. at 628. 
 290. Id. at 636. 
 291. Id. at 637 (citation omitted). 
 292. Id. at 636. 
 293. Id. at 637. 
 294. Id. (citing Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 472 F.3d 949, 953–54 
(7th Cir. 2007)). 
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being offered by the city or the state that this was a problem in New 
Mexico.295  In fact, New Mexico had recently acted to improve its 
record keeping.296  Thus, the possibility of voter fraud was found to 
be without merit.297  Finally, the court addressed whether 
preventing future impersonation fraud would support the voter ID 
requirement.298  Even if this was valid, the court found that 
exempting absentee voting from the ID requirement undermined 
claims that it was attempting to address voter fraud.299  Employing 
intermediate level analysis, the judge stated: 
 My conclusion that the October 2005 City Charter 
amendment lacks a plausible, close-fitting relationship to 
the actual prevention of voter impersonation fraud does 
not imply that all laws which seek to prevent fraud in the 
conduct of elections suffer from the same defects. In this 
regard, the 2005 amendments to the State Election Code 
provide an example of a law that provides less restrictive 
alternatives for identifying voters at the polls while at the 
same time leaving fewer loopholes available for stealing 
another person’s vote.300
On one side of the scale, the judge found that there was no 
weight to the city’s contention of voter fraud.301  In comparison, she 
found that the ID requirement placed several burdens on the 
plaintiffs’ voting rights, including concerns about whether their 
votes will be counted because their photo IDs may be rejected, and 
that they will not have enough time to vote absentee or secure 
other identification.302  The judge also cited the Missouri Supreme 
Court for noting the bureaucratic and other real costs associated 
with securing the required IDs.303  Unlike Georgia, the city had not 
undertaken a significant education program to inform voters about 
the new voting requirements.304  For all of these reasons,305 the 
 295. Id. at 638. 
 296. Id. 
   297.    Id. at 638. 
 298. Id. 
 299. Id.  
 300. Id. at 640. 
   301.    Id. at 615–17.  
 302. Id. at 635. 
 303. Id. at 634. 
 304. Id. at 634–35. 
 305. See id. at 634 (citing Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law Found., Inc., 525 
U.S. 182, 197-200 (1999) (supporting the claim that bureaucratic costs associated 
with securing an ID may constitute a severe burden.  Here the judge argued that 
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court found the new ID law to be a burden on plaintiffs’ voting 
rights.306  Assessing the weight of the city’s claims of voter fraud 
against the significant burden on voting rights, the court enjoined 
the new photo ID requirement on both First and Fourteenth 
Amendment grounds.307
G. Summary 
The courts upheld voter ID laws in four of the six jurisdictions 
litigating them.  In these four cases each court relied upon the 
flexible standard test articulated in Burdick, and using federal 
constitutional analysis they ruled that ID requirements are not a 
severe burden on voting rights, thereby precluding the need to use 
strict scrutiny.  Once invoking a lesser standard of analysis, all four 
of the cases outweighed the state interest in controlling or 
addressing voter fraud against any of the burdens associated with 
photo identification.  The courts consistently did not demand that 
the states provide empirical evidence to support or document state 
interests, instead allowing them broad leeway to enact preventive 
measures.  But when the courts looked to the evidence to support 
the states’ interests, they permitted out of state information, relied 
upon sources of questionable value (such as John Fund’s Stealing 
Elections), or allowed other accounts of fraud not directly tied into 
in–person voting at the polls to suffice as acceptable proof.  In the 
Indiana and Arizona cases, even evidence or concessions by 
defendants that fraud did not exist did not seem to matter to the 
courts. 
Conversely, while the states have not been held to a rigid 
standard of proof, the plaintiffs have.  Plaintiffs have been asked to 
show with particularity how the new photo ID requirement 
burdened their ability to vote, with the courts generally dismissing 
time or effort factors surrounding obtaining the necessary ID.  The 
courts also seem to have emphasized that some voting 
identification cards are free through an indigent bypass process, or 
whether there are provisional voting processes that get around the 
ID requirement, at least enough to escape claims that the new laws 
constitute a poll tax.  Thus, weighing an almost unquestioned state 
 
the issue in Buckley—requiring petition gatherers to wear ID badges—imposed a 
severe burden upon the First Amendment free speech rights of these 
individuals)). 
 306. Id. at 636. 
 307. Id. at 645. 
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interest against an unsubstantiated asserted burden on the right to 
vote under a less than exacting if not almost a rational basis 
scrutiny, it is no surprise that the courts have upheld the ID 
requirements. 
But the litigation in Missouri and New Mexico paint 
contrasting pictures.  The Missouri Supreme Court both rejects the 
Burdick framework and invokes state constitutional law to use strict 
scrutiny.  Conversely, in New Mexico, the Burdick test is read as an 
intermediate level analysis.  In both instances, the courts found that 
the evidence to support the state interest did not survive scrutiny. 
Despite the Missouri and New Mexico rulings, the implications 
of the litigation in Indiana, Michigan, Georgia, and Arizona are not 
hopeful for voting rights advocates.  They suggest that the courts 
will be receptive to photo ID laws for voting, potentially paving the 
way for the next great disenfranchisement based upon conjecture 
and unsubstantiated stories of fraud. 
V. FIGHTING DISENFRANCHISEMENT: LESSONS FOR LITIGATING 
FUTURE PHOTO ID CASES 
Given the track record of litigation, should voting rights 
advocates simply abandon all hope of challenging photo ID 
requirements and resign themselves to the reality of either a new 
disenfranchisement or a strategy that seeks to make the best of a 
possibly bad voting situation?  Not necessarily.  While the case law 
so far has not been promising, both Weinschenk and Santillanes, as 
well as dicta and dissents in the other cases, offer some suggestions 
on a better strategy in challenging both the ID laws in the four 
states that have already upheld them and in others contemplating 
adoption.  Moreover, voting rights supporters need to be prepared 
to engage the Burdick test, demonstrating flaws in both its logic and 
in its application. 
A. Lessons from the Photo ID Laws Already Litigated 
While four losses out of six is not a good track record, the 
victories in Missouri and New Mexico and the dicta in the other 
cases, especially Gonzalez and the dissent in the Michigan case, offer 
some important lessons that could prove useful in the future.  One 
way to challenge photo ID laws is to continue to assert that 
regulations on voting rights require strict scrutiny.  Conversely, one 
should argue that even under Burdick’s flexible standard, the 
40
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burden on rights outweighs any purported state interest.  Ideally, 
one should argue both as alternative theories.  On top of this, one 
should argue that these issues be raised both at the federal and 
state constitutional level. 
Weinschenk is an important victory because it demonstrates how 
one needs to present a challenge to these laws by using strict 
scrutiny.  Weinschenk is also an example of how state law may be an 
important source of opposing photo ID laws.308  The courts rejected 
state challenges in Michigan and to some extent in Georgia.  The 
Missouri Supreme Court distinguished the jurisprudence of its 
voting rights cases under the Missouri constitution from that found 
at the federal level.309  In drawing upon its own jurisprudence, it was 
able to bypass the Burdick analysis, finding that under its own 
constitution, infringements on the right to vote must be examined 
under strict scrutiny.310  In fact, the state constitution appeared to 
offer a compelling state interest to efforts to protect the right to 
vote.311  The shift in level of scrutiny was critical to the challenge to 
SB 1014, forcing the State to defend its interest in fraud as 
compelling and real and as narrowly tailored to abating fraud at 
the polls.312  The first simple lesson from Weinschenk is that state law 
matters and that the new judicial federalism may be beneficial to 
voting rights advocates.313
Second, plaintiffs in Weinschenk documented the real costs and 
burdens imposed upon them by the photo ID law.  As the Missouri 
Supreme Court pointed out, the litigation in this case was different 
from the case in Indiana because it could point to real as opposed 
to hypothetical burdens upon plaintiffs.314  In part, the challenges 
failed in the other states because either they were facial challenges 
to the ID laws or because plaintiffs had not properly and 
sufficiently documented the real costs or burdens in terms of dollar 
amounts or numbers of individuals affected by the new voting 
  308. See also In re Request for Advisory Opinion Regarding Constitutionality of 
2005 PA 71, 740 N.W.2d 444, 460 (Mich. 2007) (Kelly, J., dissenting) (invoking the 
Michigan Constitution in ruling on the voter ID law). 
   309.    Weinschenk v. State, 203 S.W.3d 201, 211 (Mo. 2006).  
   310.    Id. at 215.  
   311.    Id. at 203.  
   312.    Id. at 217.  
 313. See generally David Schultz, Redistricting and the New Judicial Federalism: 
Reapportionment Litigation Under State Constitutions, 37 RUTGERS L. J. 1087 (2006) 
(discussing how state constitutions are becoming increasingly important in the 
litigation of election law issues). 
 314. Weinschenck, 203 S.W.3d at 214. 
41
Schultz: Less Than Fundamental: The Myth of Voter Fraud and the Coming of
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2008
2. SCHULTZ - ADC.DOC.DOCM 1/31/2008  10:30:03 AM 
524 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:2 
                                                          
requirements.  In Missouri, plaintiffs presented both in pressing 
their arguments.315  The value in doing this was twofold.  First, in 
Weinschenk, it made it possible to demonstrate how under the 
Burdick dicta the burdens were severe and therefore strict scrutiny 
was required.316  Second, using the flexible weighing standard 
under Burdick, it is possible to calculate the actual documentation 
of burden in the analysis.317  In looking at the failure of the 
plaintiffs to prevail in Gonzalez v. Arizona, the courts on several 
occasions noted that the burdens of the new law had yet to be 
proven.318  The Supreme Court, in overturning the Ninth Circuit’s 
injunction, said the same.319  In fact, Justice Stevens, in writing 
separately on the vacating and remanding, essentially cautioned 
plaintiffs to secure the data necessary to demonstrate the burdens 
to voting rights. 
 Allowing the election to proceed without enjoining the 
statutory provisions at issue will provide the courts with a 
better record on which to judge their constitutionality. At 
least two important factual issues remain largely 
unresolved: the scope of the disenfranchisement that the 
novel identification requirements will produce, and the 
prevalence and character of the fraudulent practices that 
allegedly justify those requirements. Given the importance 
of the constitutional issues, the Court wisely takes action 
that will enhance the likelihood that they will be resolved 
correctly on the basis of historical facts rather than 
speculation.320
Thus, perhaps the second piece of good advice that emerges 
from the litigation so far is that challenges to photo ID 
requirements must either be as applied or plaintiffs must be able to 
provide a picture of the real burdens associated with them. 
In contrast to arguing that state law or the level of burden on 
voting rights demands strict scrutiny, Santillanes took seriously the 
flexible standard test of Burdick and argued the burdens.321  The 
   315.    Id. at 204–10.  
   316.    See id. at 215–17.  
   317.    See id. at 204–10.  
 318. See e.g., 485 F.3d 1041, 1049–50 (9th Cir. 2007); see also Common 
Cause/Georgia v. Billups, 504 F. Supp. 2d 1333, 1382 (contending not enough 
evidence presented to show a severe burden).   
 319. Purcell v. Gonzalez, 127 S.Ct. 5, 7–8 (2006). 
 320. Id. at 8. 
  321. 506 F. Supp. 2d 598, (D.N.M. 2007).  Cf. In re Request for Advisory 
Opinion Regarding Constitutionality of 2005 PA 71, 740 N.W.2d 444, 456–57 
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judge in this case considered what the test seems to be about when 
applied, i.e., that a test advocating weighing the relative strength of 
state interests versus burdens on voting rights requires, in fact, a 
real weighing.  Specifically, the Santillanes court gave similar careful 
consideration to the idea that a government cannot assert an 
interest without documenting evidence assessing it in light of the 
available evidence on burdens.322  In the four cases upholding the 
ID laws, the courts did not really appear to be applying the flexible 
Burdick standard by engaging in an empirical weighing of interests 
and burdens.  Finally, the judge in Santillanes demonstrated a way 
to handle facial challenges to the ID laws.  Here, Judge Armijo 
indicated that real demonstrated burdens to rights might constitute 
severe burdens necessitating strict scrutiny; but if the burdens are 
not certain, then rational basis review is not appropriate and some 
intermediate level of analysis is a better way to protect a 
fundamental right when anticipating possible burdens.323
Overall, to challenge voter ID laws, one should raise claims 
under federal and state law; one should argue both for strict and 
intermediate levels of analysis; and one should seek a challenge 
that invokes facial arguments as well as documents the burdens, 
while still advocating for an intermediate level of scrutiny. 
B. Challenging the Burdick Test 
A far more fundamental problem in the photo ID litigation is 
the Burdick test itself.  Both in its theoretical structure and in its 
application, there are flaws on numerous grounds, presenting 
litigants with an opportunity to challenge its use. 
Perhaps the first problem with the test is that the four courts 
upholding voter ID laws have let the government assert voter fraud 
as a compelling governmental interest without documenting that 
such an interest is real or based on appropriate evidence.  In fact, 
in the decisions upholding the photo ID cases, the courts have 
generally done a poor job reviewing or handling evidence.324  As 
 
(Mich. 2007) (Cavanagh, J. dissenting) (using the same flexible standard test but 
imposing little to no burden on the state). 
   322.     Santillanes, 506 F. Supp. 2d. at 615–18.  
   323.    See id. at 633–35 (examining the Missouri photo ID law under a less than 
strict scrutiny approach). 
   324.  See generally Daniel P. Tokaji, Leave it to the Lower Courts: On Judicial 
Intervention and Administration, 68 OHIO ST. L. J. 1065 (2007) (discussing a similar 
point). 
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the district court judge stated in Billups: “the legislature has wide 
latitude in determining the problems it wishes to address and the 
manner in which it desires to address them.”325  There are several 
problems with this approach. 
First, the Supreme Court in election law cases has not stated 
that the compelling interest may be simply asserted without 
empirical foundations.  Instead, evidence must be offered to 
support the interest to override a fundamental right.326  For 
example, in Buckley v. Valeo,327 the Court first reviewed a series of 
proffered claims to limit political contributions or expenditures.328  
In doing so it rejected several interests—such as equalizing voices 
or speech—as illegitimate interests.329  Second, once the Court 
accepted one interest as compelling—preventing corruption or the 
appearance of corruption—it demanded that some evidence be 
offered to support it.330  The importance of this evidence was 
underscored in Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 331 where 
the Court, in ascertaining what must be shown in order for political 
contributions to be upheld, stated: “The quantum of empirical 
evidence needed to satisfy heightened judicial scrutiny of legislative 
judgments will vary up or down with the novelty and plausibility of 
the justification raised.”332  In Randall v. Sorrell,333 the Court again 
underscored the important role of evidence to support state 
interests when it rejected the contribution and expenditure limits 
imposed by Vermont.334  In numerous cases the Supreme Court has 
demanded that the compelling interest be real and not merely 
conjecture,335 or at least some evidence be offered to support the 
 325. Common Cause/Ga. v. Billups, 504 F. Supp. 2d 1333, 1381 (N.D. Ga. 
2007) (quoting Ind. Democratic Party v. Rokita, 458 F. Supp. 2d 775, 829 (S.D. 
Ind. 2006)). 
 326. See also Constitutionality of 2005 PA 71, 740 N.W.2d at 456–57. 
 327. 424 U.S. 1 (1976). 
   328.    Id. at 39–50.  
 329. Id. at 48–49. 
 330. Id. at 26–27. 
 331. 528 U.S. 377 (2000). 
 332. Id. at 378. 
 333. 126 S.Ct. 2479 (2006). 
 334. Id. at 2514. 
 335. See, e.g., Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 528 (2001); City of 
Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 300 (2000); Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. F.C.C., 520 
U.S. 180, 195 (1997); Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 496–97 (1995); 
Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 628 (1995); Edenfield v. Fane, 507 
U.S. 761, 762 (1993). 
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interest.336  Letting the government off the hook from having to 
show the reality of the interest is simply an invitation for abuse of 
rights. 
Moreover, the evidence must be relevant and credible to 
support the interest asserted.  Judge Armijo in the New Mexico case 
said the same.  Recall also the district court judge in Rokita 
dismissing the Brace Report as unreliable under the Federal Rule 
of Evidence 702.337  The judge in Santillanes repeatedly stressed the 
lack of admissible evidence supporting the governmental interest in 
addressing fraud.338  Judges need to apply Rule 702 and more fully 
accept their role under Daubert standards when deciding to admit 
evidence about fraud into court.339  More specifically, as the first 
part of the article demonstrated, much of the evidence of fraud is 
not tied to voters, or the studies rely on conjecture or unproven 
assertions.340  Thus, citations or references to Fund’s Stealing 
Elections or unproven assertions as found in the Carter-Baker 
Report should be rendered inadmissible as failing Rule 702’s 
Daubert standards.  Finally, some types of evidence should not be 
material to supporting photo ID requirements.  For example, in 
Rokita the judge cited to survey data as evidence that the public 
supports the use of photo IDs for voting.341  Public opinion and fear 
as justifying restrictions on fundamental rights are immaterial and 
tantamount to a “heckler’s veto” on free speech.342  The entire 
purpose of the Bill of Rights is to check majority factions or the 
 336. See, e.g., FEC v. Wisconsin Right To Life, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2652, 2692 
(2007); First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 788 (1978); Buckley v. 
Valeo, 424 US. 1, 46 (1976) (discussing the role of evidence in supporting facial 
versus applied challenges); see also Stephen E. Gottlieb, Compelling Governmental 
Interests: An Essential But Unanalyzed Term in Constitutional Adjudication, 68 B.U. L. 
REV. 917, 955–56 (1988) (discussing the importance of the governmental interest 
being real). 
 337. See Ind. Democratic Party v. Rokita, 458 F. Supp. 2d 775, 803 (S.D. Ind. 
2006). 
 338. See Women Voters of Albuquerque/Bernalillo County, Inc. v. Santillanes, 
506 F.Supp.2d 598, 637 (D.N.M. 2007). 
 339. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993) (assigning 
judges the role of determining the appropriateness of allowing scientific and 
expert testimony into the record). 
 340. See infra Part II.B. 
 341. Rokita, 458 F. Supp. 2d at 794. 
 342. See Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4–5 (1949) (describing 
early on the use of public anger to impact fundamental voting rights). 
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tyranny of the majority from encroaching upon the rights of a 
minority.343
In addition, for the evidence to be real it needs to be 
jurisdiction–specific.  By that, one should not be able to support 
the compelling interest of addressing fraud in one jurisdiction by 
pointing to evidence in another.  For example, in rejecting efforts 
to limit campaign contributions, the court in Kruse v. City of 
Cincinnati344 noted that the city had no experience with 
contribution limits at the local level at the time the spending limit 
was passed.345  As a result, the city had no evidence that 
contribution limits were inadequate to prevent actual and 
perceived quid pro quo corruption.346  The city mistakenly relied 
on the federal experience in national elections with contribution 
limitations to support its contention that they will inevitably prove 
inadequate at the local level.347  As a result, the court voided the 
contribution limits.348
The Burdick test itself also appears to be flawed in several ways.  
For example, there is an asymmetry in its application to evidence.  
As the four cases upholding the ID laws demonstrate, plaintiffs 
were required to document evidence of burden but defendants 
were not required to do the same.  At the very least, the same 
standards of documentation should apply.  Moreover, if the issue in 
the case is whether the ID is a burden to a constitutionally 
protected right, the presumption should initially be that the 
 343. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943). The Court 
stated: 
The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from 
the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach 
of majorities and officials and to establish them as legal principles to be 
applied by the courts. One's right to life, liberty, and property, to free 
speech, a free press, freedom of worship and assembly, and other 
fundamental rights may not be submitted to vote; they depend on the 
outcome of no elections. 
Id. at 638.  See also D. Bruce LaPierre, Campaign Contribution Limits: Pandering to 
Public Fears About “Big Money” and Protecting Incumbents, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 687, 694 
(2000) (arguing how appeals to the fears of majorities is pandering and not an 
appropriate measure to justify restrictions on free speech). 
 344. 142 F.3d 907 (6th Cir.1998). 
 345. Id. at 916. 
   346.    Id. at 915–16.     
   347.    Id. at 916.  
 348. See generally David Schultz, Proving Political Corruption: Documenting the 
Evidence Required to Sustain Campaign Finance Reform Laws, 18 REV. LITIG. 85 (1999) 
(arguing the necessity of making the evidence real and jurisdiction specific). 
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government bears the burden to show why the regulation is not 
severe, instead of requiring the plaintiff to show the severity. 
Dissenting in Constitutionality of 2005 PA 71, Judge Cavanagh 
found that 2005 PA 71 was unconstitutional.349  In reaching that 
conclusion, he argued that strict scrutiny was required because, 
following Burdick, photo ID requirements impose a severe burden 
on voting rights.350  Judge Cavanagh supported this point first by 
contending that because the photo ID requirement will deny some 
citizens the right to vote, the presumption that the statute is 
constitutional is not applicable.351 Second, Cavanagh noted that the 
ID requirement will impose classifications upon those who exercise 
voting rights, i.e., on the poor, elderly, disabled, and upon racial 
and ethnic populations by subjecting them to different burdens 
than others.352  Given the presumption of unconstitutionality and 
the differential treatment of some groups, 2005 PA 71 must be 
subjected to strict scrutiny.353  Moreover, according to Judge 
Cavanagh, “[t]he government cannot now shield itself from strict 
scrutiny because it provides only a purported rational basis for the 
requirement while simultaneously failing to provide any evidence 
to support its purported rationale.”354  In effect, Judge Cavanagh 
accuses the majority of engaging in circular logic: the state does not 
need empirical evidence to support its interest in restricting voting 
because strict scrutiny is not required to restrict the right to vote. 
Judge Cavanagh effectively argues that an interest can only be 
compelling if there is evidence to support it.  Even if the interest 
need not be compelling, but only rational, the “restriction, in this 
case a photo identification requirement, must be reasonable given 
the interest the restriction allegedly serves.”355  Whatever the test, real 
evidence is necessary to support an interest and the burden it 
 349. In re Request for Advisory Opinion Regarding Constitutionality of 2005 
PA 71, 740 N.W.2d 444, 469 (Mich. 2007). 
 350. Id. at 463. 
 351. Id. at 472. 
 352. Id. at 473. 
 353. Id. at 493 (citing Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 
(1966)).  "[W]here fundamental rights and liberties are asserted under the Equal 
Protection Clause, classifications which might invade or restrain them must be 
closely scrutinized and carefully confined."  Id. 
 354. Id. at 472. 
 355. Id. at 474. 
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imposes upon voting.356  Thus, lacking evidence, the restriction is 
unconstitutional.357
For numerous reasons, Judge Cavanagh’s comments are 
significant.  First, the test should require the government to detail 
what constitutes a “severe” burden on a fundamental right.  After 
all, that is the normal requirement whenever the government seeks 
to infringe upon these types of rights.358
The Burdick test is also problematic in that it too never 
explained what “severe” meant, apparently leaving it up to the 
discretion of judges to ascertain its meaning.  Indeed, there is a real 
circularity and inconsistency to the test.  Before one can decide 
which level of analysis one has to use, the court must make a prior 
determination about whether the burden is severe or not.  If not, 
then the flexible standard is used.  Thus, if Burdick is supposed to 
be a test, the outcome almost seems decided by a prior subjective 
determination that the burden is not severe.  Once that is 
concluded, it is almost a foregone conclusion that a not-too-severe 
burden will be classified as a legitimate regulation that will be 
capable of upholding the ID requirement.  In Fullilove v. 
Klutznick,359 Justice Marshall remarked of strict scrutiny that it is 
“strict in theory, but fatal in fact.”360  Under Burdick, if an ID 
regulation is not severe in theory, it will not be found severe in fact.  
The initial determination of burden appears to resolve the case.  
Thus, the Burdick test, used this way, is superfluous to resolving the 
controversy. 
Courts must be more serious in weighing the government’s 
interest against the burden on plaintiffs even if they plan to use the 
Burdick flexible standard of review.  If one pits an unproven or 
unsubstantiated government interest against a demonstrated 
burden, the weight assigned to the interest has to be nearly zero.  
Still, the four courts using the Burdick flexible standard seem to 
assume woodenly that if they have decided the burden is not 
severe, then they will automatically uphold the regulation.  This 
does not appear to be what the Burdick Court intended.  Plaintiffs 
should thus assign the weights to the interests and burdens and be 
   356.    Id. at 486. 
   357.    Id. 
   358. See also Stephen E. Gottlieb, Compelling Governmental Interests: An Essential 
But Unanalyzed Term in Constitutional Adjudication, 68 B.U. L. REV. 917, 955-56 
(1988) (arguing the importance of the requirement to protect democracy). 
 359. 448 U.S. 448 (1980) (Marshall, J., concurring). 
 360. Id. at 519. 
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prepared to present both the severe and not–so–severe burden 
arguments. 
Finally, the four courts thus far upholding voter ID laws have 
simply gotten it wrong when applying the Burdick test.  They seem 
to be applying the test like a light switch in either finding the 
burden to be severe and therefore requiring strict scrutiny, or not 
finding the burden to be severe and therefore using what appears 
to be something more closely resembling rational basis.  In effect, 
they have misread Burdick as overturning past precedent that found 
voting to be a fundamental right.  Judge Cavanagh was correct in 
pointing out this error.361  The test does not push an examination 
of the burdens on voting rights to rational basis if the burdens are 
determined not to be severe.362  Instead, the Indiana court correctly 
determined that some form of intermediate scrutiny is 
demanded.363
VI. CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this article has been to document the illusory 
nature of the evidence purporting voter fraud and to show 
plaintiffs how best to defend against attacks on the right to vote: by 
challenging the evidence, the application of the Burdick test, and 
even the test itself. 
The battle over voter photo identification is a battle for 
democracy against a second great wave of voter 
disenfranchisement.  Like the first wave at the end of the 
Nineteenth and beginning of the Twentieth Centuries, which 
augmented the fear of voter fraud as a way to disenfranchise 
African-Americans, ex-felons, urban poor, and ethnic populations, 
the new disenfranchisement uses similar fears to accomplish the 
same today.  The case for voter fraud—individuals impersonating 
others at the polls—is largely built on hype and the type of hearsay 
that should not be permitted in court for the purposes of denying 
 361. Constitutionality of 2005 PA 71, 740 N.W.2d 444, 489 (Cavanaugh, J., 
dissenting). 
 362. See Jacqueline Ricciani, Burdick v. Takushi: the Anderson Balancing Test to 
Sustain Prohibitions on Write-in Voting, 13 PACE L. REV. 949 (1994) (examining the 
Burdick test and concluding that its adoption of the ballot access cases indicate that 
some form of intermediate level of scrutiny is required when the burdens on 
voting rights are found to be less than severe). 
 363. See also Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 472 F.3d 949, 954, 956 
(7th Cir. 2007) (contending that Burdick’s lesser level of scrutiny calls for at least 
“strict scrutiny light”) (Evans, J., dissenting). 
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individuals the right to vote.  Unfortunately, in four cases so far, the 
courts have been unwilling to police the evidence, take seriously 
the fundamental nature of voting rights, and protect franchise 
rights. 
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